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Article 
Why Rape Should Not (Always) Be a 
Crime 
Katharine K. Baker† 
Shouldn’t rape, an act of bodily invasion that can trauma-
tize, endanger, and dehumanize its victims, be punished as 
crime? For centuries, lawmakers, philosophers, legal theorists, 
and women’s rights advocates have converged upon the crimi-
nal law as the appropriate vehicle to reflect society’s opprobri-
um and inculcate norms against rape. This may be changing. In 
response to a broad and comprehensive enforcement effort by 
the Department of Education (DOE), many universities are re-
drafting their campus sexual assault policies.1 DOE has made 
clear that it believes that Title IX of the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
requires schools to “address sexual violence and other forms of 
sex discrimination.”2 “[S]exual violence refers to physical sexual 
acts perpetrated against a person’s will or where a person is in-
capable of giving consent . . . .”3 In other words, notwithstand-
 
 †
 
Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent College of Law. Thanks to Alex Boni-
Saenz, Kim Bailey, Mark Rosen, Chris Schmidt, and especially Stephanie 
Stern for very helpful comments on earlier drafts. Copyright © 2015 by 
Katharine K. Baker. 
 1. On May 1, 2014, the Department of Education (DOE) released the 
names of fifty-five colleges and universities that it was investigating for poten-
tially discriminatory practices relating to sexual assault on campus. Jennifer 
Steinhauer & David S. Joachim, 55 Colleges Named in Federal Inquiry into 
Handling of Sexual Assault Cases, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2014, at A15. That list 
has now grown to sixty-four and includes some of the country’s most prestig-
ious universities. Tyler Kingkade, 64 Colleges Are Now Under Investigation for 
Their Handling of Sexual Assaults, HUFFINGTON POST (June 30, 2014, 12:59 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/06/30/colleges-under-investigation 
-sex-assault_n_5543694.html.  
 2. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t Educ., U.S. Department of Education Re-
leases List of Higher Education Institutions with Open Title IX Sexual Vio-
lence Investigations (May 1, 2014) (emphasis added), http://www.ed.gov/news/ 
press-releases/us-department-education-releases-list-higher-education 
-institutions-open-title-ix-sexual-violence-investigations. 
 3. Id.  
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ing twenty centuries of treating rape as a criminal injury, DOE 
has recast rape as a civil wrong—a discriminatory act. This Ar-
ticle argues that by invoking a civil process, DOE is likely to 
meet with more success in reducing the amount of nonconsen-
sual sex. Once it does so, the norm of male entitlement that 
gives rise to so much criminal conduct may be destabilized 
enough to enable the criminal law as reformed to be enforced. 
The story of criminal rape law’s undoing begins with the 
rape reform movement of the 1970’s and 80’s, which attempted 
to have the criminal law take rape more seriously. The individ-
ual goals of different state rape reform movements were many 
and tactics varied, but one overriding goal, shared by virtually 
all reformers, was to expand the amount of criminally pro-
scribed activity. Traditional rape law reflected a social norm 
that validated men’s entitlement to sex4 and allowed men to 
consistently ignore and override women’s will. By refusing to 
criminalize sexual activity coerced without force, and often 
perpetrated by men that women knew, the law sanctioned 
men’s routine appropriation of sex from women. The goal of 
rape reform was to make women’s willingness to have sex, her 
consent, the centerpiece of the rape inquiry; men would no 
longer feel so entitled to disregard a woman’s will in their at-
tempt to get as much sex as they wanted.5 It is because that 
norm has not shifted sufficiently that DOE must now use a civil 
cause of action to combat what had been seen as a criminal 
problem.  
This Article advances three overlapping but different rea-
sons why the criminal law has not been more successful in 
 
 4. A “culture of sexual entitlement” is how an independent commission 
recently described the norms that enabled, if not caused, two different sexual 
assaults allegedly perpetrated by Boston University’s men’s ice hockey team. 
One of these incidents resulted in the accused player pleading guilty to assault 
and battery. See Boston University Office of the President, Report of the Men’s 
Ice Hockey Task Force, BOS. UNIV. (Aug. 28, 2012) http://www.bu.edu/  
president/reports/hockey-task-force. Diana Russell helped explain this sense of 
entitlement forty years ago, when she asked one of her subjects about her im-
pressions of what motivated the man who raped her. “I think what was going 
on in his head was ‘Me, Graham, horny. You, woman!’” DIANA E. H. RUSSELL, 
THE POLITICS OF RAPE: THE VICTIM’S PERSPECTIVE 93 (1975).  
 5. Rape scholar Cassia Spohn writes that many rape reformers viewed 
the law’s traditional approach to rape as “designed [not] to protect women 
from sexual assault, but to preserve male rights to possess and subjugate 
women as sexual objects.” Cassia C. Spohn, The Rape Reform Movement: The 
Traditional Common Law and Rape Law Reforms, 39 JURIMETRICS J. 119, 121 
(1999).  
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changing the social norms with regard to male entitlement to 
sex. First, the criminal burden of proof makes norm transfor-
mation exceedingly difficult. Making consent the determinative 
factor in rape does little good if proving the absence thereof—
beyond a reasonable doubt, no less—is all but impossible. A law 
that defines rape as nonconsensual sex may get the theory of 
rape right, but it ignores the overwhelming practical difficulty 
of proving non-consent to an act for which there are no wit-
nesses, no extrinsic evidence, and often no particular reason to 
think that the act was not consensual. This problem applies to 
a huge amount of sexual misconduct, whether secured through 
force or not. If behavior is not punished criminally because it 
cannot be proved, then the public’s understanding of criminal 
behavior will not change.  
Second, competing constructions of “the rapist” under-
mined feminist attempts to denormalize male predatory behav-
ior. Shortly after most of the original rape reform measures 
were implemented, a new wave of changes to rape law 
emerged, much of it generated at the federal level. Tough-on-
rapists measures enacted in the 1990s reflect an understanding 
of rapists as profoundly deviant and distinctly criminal. This 
pathological view of rape rejects the feminist insight at the core 
of much rape reform, which was that male appropriation of sex 
is commonplace and completely understandable given hetero-
sexual scripts and norms of sexual pursuit.  
Third, rape reformers failed to appreciate the delicate rela-
tionship between rape’s injury, victims’ agency, and the crimi-
nal law. In an effort to combat social norms that divested wom-
en of sexual agency, rape reform efforts asked all parties—
victim, potential perpetrator, and jurors—to assume women 
lack agency; but women often resist being viewed this way. 
Moreover, when rape is a crime against the state, enforcement 
of it necessarily inhibits a victim’s agency because the enforce-
ment power and decision-making is vested in someone other 
than the victim. While this is true of all personal injury crimes, 
it is a particular problem with rape law if the essence of the in-
jury is an affront to a victim’s autonomy and agency. Enforcing 
the crime thus tends to accentuate rather than alleviate the in-
jury to agency, and women consistently refuse to label their 
own experiences as rape, even if the criminal law would seem 
to.  
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explores the primary 
legal frameworks for understanding rape law over time. It trac-
es the origins of rape as a sometimes civil, sometimes criminal, 
wrong—through the patriarchal view of rape as a property 
crime, to the feminist (and liberal) remake of rape into an indi-
vidual criminal injury to autonomy. It then briefly discusses re-
cent rejections of the liberal/feminist position.6 Parts II–IV ex-
plore the three major impediments to effective norm change in 
more detail.  
Part V, after explaining why the recent proposed revisions 
to the Model Penal Code are not likely to overcome the prob-
lems previously discussed, demonstrates why DOE’s initiative 
to use Title IX to curb sexual assaults on campuses may be 
more effective. If the new campus policies are effective in reduc-
ing the amount of nonconsensual sex, the norms of male enti-
tlement that rape reformers originally tried to dislodge may be 
eroded sufficiently for the criminal law to effectively combat 
nonconsensual sex. The key to initially dislodging the norm, 
however, will be distancing the university procedures from the 
criminal law.  
Resistance to the new policies to date has come mostly 
from those unwilling to see university procedures as distinct 
from the criminal law. Thus, critics either insist that the prob-
lem be addressed in the criminal system,7 or they insist that 
universities provide criminal law safeguards for those accused.8 
But these new policies do not involve charging men on college 
campuses with rape. The accused are being charged with per-
petrating discriminatory conduct. If found responsible for such 
conduct, the men should not be considered rapists. Indeed, be-
 
 6. See Jed Rubenfeld, The Riddle of Rape-by-Deception and the Myth of 
Sexual Autonomy, 122 YALE L.J. 1372 (2013).  
 7. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, Mishandling Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 
2014, at SR1 (“[S]exual assault on campus should mean what it means in . . . 
courts of law.”); Caroline Kitchens, Overreaching on Campus Rape, NAT’L REV. 
(May 13, 2014), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/377878/overreaching 
-campus-rape-caroline-kitchens (“If President Obama really wants to take 
rape seriously, he will take the power away from campus kangaroo courts and 
place such criminal investigations where they belong: in the hands of trained 
law enforcement.”). 
 8. Numerous Harvard Law School faculty members signed a petition 
criticizing Harvard’s proposed rules, in part because those rules did not pro-
vide adequate opportunity to investigate facts and confront witnesses. See 
Elizabeth Bartholet, Rethink Harvard’s Sexual Harassment Policy, BOS. 
GLOBE, Oct. 15, 2014, at A11.  
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cause most people are still not ready to call most men who se-
cure sex without consent “rapists,” DOE and universities must 
be careful not to allow people to conflate what DOE is prohibit-
ing with rape.  
DOE’s policies do not necessarily represent a codification of 
the feminist theory that all nonconsensual sex is rape. One can 
believe that the rape reform movement went “too far” in crimi-
nalizing nonconsensual sex and still believe that nonconsensual 
sex is wrong, that its prevalence is rooted in male entitlement 
to sex, and that male entitlement to sex has a serious, negative, 
and discriminatory impact on college women. The goal of DOE’s 
policies is to reduce that discriminatory male conduct by dis-
lodging the norms that reproduce it.  
I.  THE THEORIES OF RAPE   
This Part provides a brief history of rape law, with an 
emphasis on the relatively recent debate over if and how the 
law should implement a standard that protects women’s 
autonomy by criminalizing nonconsensual sex.  
A. THE TRADITIONAL AND MOSTLY OLD VIEW 
The first known prohibition on rape appears in Hammura-
bi’s Code and dates from 1900 B.C.9 Hebrew law punished rape 
of a married woman with death, but rape of an unmarried 
woman with a fine of fifty shekels and the rapist had to marry 
his victim. Under early Roman law, raptus was a private, not a 
public wrong, and involved carrying a woman off by force, with 
or without intercourse. “The specific malice of the offense con-
sisted not in the sexual ravishment of the woman, but in steal-
ing her away from her parents, guardian or husband.”10  
Monetary compensation for rape follows logically when 
women are viewed as property because rape causes economic 
injury to the men who own women.11 The criminalization of 
 
 9. See KEITH BURGESS-JACKSON, RAPE: A PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGA-
TION 68 (1996). 
 10. JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, Rape and Marriage in the Medieval Canon Law, 
in SEX, LAW, AND MARRIAGE IN THE MIDDLE AGES 63 (1993).  
 11. Consider this report from a Justice of the Peace in England in 1745: 
Granted a warrant against John Newman of the tithing of Marston, 
yeoman, at the complaint of Jane Biggs, wife of John Biggs of same, 
for his assaulting her with intent to have carnal knowledge of her 
body. Upon his appearance, the fact was so clearly proved upon him, 
upon the oath of the complainant, that I adjudged him to pay unto 
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rape under this view makes sense for the same reason that 
criminalizing larceny makes sense. The state has a legitimate 
interest in making sure property interests are secure and sta-
ble. This usually means protecting the status quo. Protection of 
that status quo includes protection of the family relationships 
in which patriarchal control is respected by all.12  
Thus, under the conservative patriarchal world view, there 
is no need to get mired in questions of whether the rapist in-
tended to hurt the woman, or was recklessly indifferent to her 
consent, or was just trying to have consensual sex but read her 
body language wrong. By having sex with another man’s prop-
erty, a perpetrator was injuring another man. This system 
seems inapposite today not just because it placed such a high 
value on women’s chastity, but because it was protecting men 
from their women’s defilement.  
Discomfort with viewing rape as a property crime emerged 
as early as the 12th century. At that time, canonical scholars 
began to distinguish rape from other property crimes.13 The law 
started placing responsibility on the victim to “cry out in pro-
test” though there was little consensus on how much force was 
necessary to secure prosecution.14 As that early debate pres-
aged, once the law rejects the idea of women as property of an-
other, it needs another way of conceptualizing rape and wom-
en’s role in it.  
B. THE LIBERAL, FEMINIST AND MOSTLY CODIFIED VIEW  
1. Theory 
In her influential 1975 historical study of rape, Susan 
Brownmiller argued that not much changed with regard to rape 
 
John Biggs for damages 5 guineas . . . . 
Roy Porter, Rape—Does It Have a Historical Meaning? in RAPE 217 (Sylvana 
Tomaselli & Roy Porter eds., 1986). 
 12. See BURGESS-JACKSON, supra note 9, at 48 (“To the conservative, the 
rapist sets back not just a particular man’s interest in the exclusive possession 
and control of his property, but the interest of society as a whole in having 
strong patriarchal marriages and families.”); David Dyzenhaus, John Stuart 
Mill and the Harm of Pornography, 102 ETHICS 534, 550 (1992) (“Conserva-
tives think that the use of state coercion is justified when there is a threat to 
what they hold to be the core values of a legitimate status quo.”).  
 13. BRUNDAGE, supra note 10, at 66. 
 14. Id. at 68–69 (“[I]t is not surprising to find that the medieval canon-
ists—like modern lawyers, one may add—were far from unanimous in defining 
just what degree of force must be demonstrated to prove rape.”). 
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law between the 13th and 20th centuries.15 The 12th century 
debate about weeping and wailing and hue and cry was a de-
bate about how much force and how much resistance were nec-
essary before the law could classify a man’s sexual aggression 
as rape. It was Brownmiller and other feminist writers in the 
1970s, writing about the ubiquity of men overriding women’s 
will, with force or without it, that spurred the rape reform 
movement.16  
The predominant definition of rape at that time—“carnal 
knowledge, of a woman, not the man’s wife, forcibly and against 
her will”—not only contained vestiges of a patriarchal world in 
which women were the property of their husbands (if not their 
fathers), it made force and resistance necessary elements of the 
crime.17 It was clear, though, that rape was no longer consid-
ered a property crime. In a polity in which the individual, not 
the family, is the basic unit for governance, rape cannot be a 
crime against a family whose property is damaged. It has to be 
a crime against an individual who is unlawfully touched. Rape 
thus seems to be some form of battery. If it is a battery, though, 
there would be no reason for a legal requirement to resist; other 
victims of battery do not have to resist unwanted physical 
touching in order for the law to view the touching as unlawful.  
Reformers offered a different view of rape, arguably one 
much more in line with a polity that was increasingly willing to 
view women as legitimate, autonomous agents of their own 
economic, social, and sexual destiny.18 Rape became a crime in-
volving the nonconsensual touching of a particular part of the 
body. What makes rape different from other batteries is the 
part of the body that is touched or invaded. Nonconsensual 
 
 15. SUSAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE 
30 (1975) (“From the thirteenth to the twentieth century, little changed.”). 
 16. See Spohn, supra note 5 (giving credit to these feminist chroniclers of 
rape for starting the rape reform movement); see also SUSAN GRIFFIN, RAPE: 
THE ALL AMERICAN CRIME (1971) (criticizing the patriarchal culture that en-
courages rape); RUSSELL, supra note 4 (relating rape victims’ stories).  
 17. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 891–94 (5th ed. 2010).  
 18. At a theoretical level, the feminist effort to redefine rape was not that 
controversial because by making consent, or lack thereof, the defining compo-
nent of rape, the reformers were reifying a liberal construction of the individ-
ual. Women were people whose will mattered. To the extent there was contro-
versy over making women’s will matter, it centered on how the law could tell 
what women’s will was. Critics of rape reform argued that women often said 
no when they meant yes and that any judicial scrutiny of what was verbally 
expressed during sex would inevitably ruin the spontaneity and thrill of sexu-
al experience for both parties. See infra text accompanying notes 100–02.  
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sexual activity is an unwanted intrusion onto and into a part of 
the body that for physiological or cultural reasons, or both, is 
understood as deeply infused with emotion and bonding and 
pleasure and privacy. Nonconsensual intercourse or touching of 
this part of the body may cause emotional, relational, hedonic, 
and dignitary injuries.  
What makes rape injurious under this view is the unique-
ness of the sexual parts of the body. Nonconsensual interfer-
ence with one’s arm—perhaps when someone grabs you on a 
crowded subway—is not as injurious as rape, because rape in-
volves that part of the body that is special. And, of course, what 
makes the definitional issue even more problematic is that con-
sensual touching of that part of the body is commonplace, en-
joyable, and fine. So it is not just the touching, and it is not just 
the part of the body that is touched. What makes rape rape is 
that the touching of that part of the body is nonconsensual.19 
Force and resistance have nothing to do with it. Overriding the 
victim’s will that she not be touched in that particular area by 
that particular person constitutes the gravamen of rape. It is 
that act of disregarding her will that violates women’s sexual 
autonomy.20 
2. Rape Reform 
This liberal construction of rape law undergirds all of the 
1970s and 1980s rape reform efforts. In order to effectuate a 
change toward a focus on consent, reformers concentrated on 
three areas.21 First, they enacted statutes that criminalized 
nonconsensual sex secured without any use of force and elimi-
nated the resistance requirement. The law of aggravated bat-
tery polices force;22 the law of rape was supposed to police some-
thing else. While the resistance requirement had often helped 
the state prove force (because perpetrators used force to over-
come victim resistance), there was no justifiable reason to re-
 
 19. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 388 (1992) (“[A]ll that 
distinguishes [rape] from ordinary sexual intercourse is lack of consent . . . .”). 
 20. For a comprehensive account of rape as a violation of women’s sexual 
autonomy, see STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, UNWANTED SEX: THE CULTURE OF 
INTIMIDATION AND THE FAILURE OF LAW (1998) (concluding chapter entitled 
“Taking Sexual Autonomy Seriously”). 
 21. Spohn, supra note 5, at 122 (reformers concentrated on three areas: 
eliminating force, enacting rape shield laws, and introducing gradations of 
sexual offenses).  
 22. See LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 860.  
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quire women to physically resist an illegal act. One is not re-
quired to resist assault or robbery or any other battery. Most 
state statutes and state Supreme Courts now articulate at least 
some definitions of rape or sexual assault that do not include 
force.23 Thus, technically, it is a crime in most states to know-
ingly disregard a woman’s will when securing sex.  
Second, and relatedly, reformers offered gradations of sex-
ual assault. With the encouragement of prosecutors, who knew 
that nonviolent sexual attacks would be viewed with some 
skepticism, the vast majority of states have adopted a variety of 
sexually aggressive offenses: rape, aggravated rape, sexual as-
sault, sexual abuse, etc. It is not just traditional carnal 
knowledge secured by force, but a variety of potentially offen-
sive sexual contact, secured with or without force, that is crim-
inalized.24  
Third, reformers enacted evidentiary shield laws that 
barred evidence of women’s prior sexual behavior.25 This was 
necessary in order to focus the trial on what actually happened 
during the event in question, not on whether a woman might 
have consented before.  
These changes attempted to recognize (i) the legitimacy of 
an alleged victim’s voice—force and physical resistance should 
not be necessary if the victim expressed her desire not to pro-
ceed—and (ii) respect for women’s decision-making capacity—
 
 23. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.4 cmt. (AM. LAW INST., Tentative Draft 
No.1 2014) [hereinafter ALI Draft] (explaining that only twelve states main-
tain the traditional force requirement). But see John F. Decker & Peter G. 
Baroni, “No” Still Means “Yes”: The Failure of the “Non-Consent” Reform 
Movement in American Rape and Sexual Assault Law, 101 J. CRIM. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 1081, 1084–86 (2012) (indicating that twenty-eight states allow the 
prosecution to convict by showing the victim did not consent; nine states ap-
pear to allow for conviction with only nonconsent, but to establish lack of con-
sent, the prosecution must prove force or inability to consent; sixteen states do 
not have non-consent offenses—though fifteen of these sixteen allow “incapaci-
ty to consent” to substitute for force). 
 24. Professor Patricia Falk lists seven different “nonviolent” categories of 
behavior that are often criminalized: (i) abuse of trust; (ii) abuse of authority; 
(iii) nonconsensual sex without force; (iv) sex accomplished through coercion or 
extortion; (v) sex with a drunk or drugged victim who is not capable of know-
ingly consenting; (vi) sex with a mentally incapacitated person who is not ca-
pable of knowingly consenting; and (vii) sex secured through fraud. See Patri-
cia J. Falk, Not Logic, but Experience: Drawing on Lessons from the Real 
World in Thinking About the Riddle of Rape-by-Fraud, 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 
353, 357–58 (2013).  
 25. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 412 (prohibiting admission of evidence offered 
as proof of a victim’s sexual predisposition or prior sexual history).  
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that a woman had consented to sex before did not mean she 
consented this time.26 Still, it did not take long for commenta-
tors to recognize that many of the most common ways for men 
to routinely extract sex from women not only did not involve 
force, they did not even involve obvious rejection of a woman’s 
voice. Sexual scripts and norms with regard to sexual activity 
dictated that men were active and women were passive.27 
Women were supposed to say no when they meant yes or to not 
say anything at all.28 Men were supposed to—or at least al-
lowed to—proceed in the face of ambiguity because ambiguity is 
what made sex exciting.  
Given the strength of those scripts and norms, it was not 
surprising to see studies showing that men often confused 
women’s abject fear for passive acquiescence.29 One widely-
respected comprehensive study found that 22% of women re-
ported having been forced to do something sexual by a man 
while only 3% of men reported having forced a woman to do 
something sexual.30 Men tend to interpret women’s nonverbal 
actions as indicia of desire to consent, when women do not 
 
 26. That these changes were necessary at all shows the unique position of 
rape in the criminal law and our culture. Embedded in the traditional ap-
proach to rape was a deep distrust of women—a distrust reflected in the for-
mal definition, which required force, and a distrust that manifested itself in 
relatively commonplace jury acquittals. It was not the “law” but juries who 
had previously concluded that a woman who had consented once, must have 
consented again or was disreputable enough that the jury simply did not care 
whether she consented. Katharine K. Baker, Once A Rapist? Motivational Ev-
idence and Relevancy in Rape Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 563, 586–88 (1997) (ar-
guing that it was jury disregard for women who seemed “loose” as much as ju-
ry disbelief that led juries to acquit in cases with victims who had a sexual 
past).  
 27. Robin Warshaw & Andrea Parrot, The Contribution of Sex-Role So-
cialization to Acquaintance Rape, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE: THE HIDDEN 
CRIME 75 (Andrea Parrot & Laurie Bechhofer eds., 1991) (“From their sociali-
zation in childhood and adolescence, [men and women] develop[] different 
goals related to sexuality . . . . [M]en are supposed to singlemindedly go after 
sexual intercourse with a female, regardless of how they do it. . . . [W]omen 
should passively acquiesce or use any strategy to try to avoid sexual inter-
course.”).  
 28. Id. at 75–76. 
 29. See, e.g., Eugene J. Kanin, Date Rape: Unofficial Criminals and Vic-
tims, 9 VICTIMOLOGY 95, 97 (1984) (noting that some perpetrators in the study 
had mistaken their victims’ fear for acquiescence).  
 30. ROBERT T. MICHAEL ET AL., SEX IN AMERICA: A DEFINITIVE SURVEY 
221–28 (1994) (suggesting that there is a “gender chasm” when it comes to 
perceptions on whether sex was forced).  
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mean for those actions to be interpreted even as sexual inter-
est, much less consent.31 
Accordingly, many feminist writers encouraged courts to 
move toward an affirmative consent standard, what a co-author 
and I have labeled “a baseline of no,”32 and others have called 
the “Yes Model.”33 Not only should no mean no, silence should 
mean no. Unless she says yes, the answer should be no. Several 
states adopted statutes that seemed to require affirmative as-
sent to sex.34 California recently adopted an affirmative consent 
standard to be applied at all colleges and universities receiving 
state funding.35 Other states have simply proved more willing 
to convict men who proceed in the face of ambiguity.36 Some 
states have also adjusted the mens rea for rape so that negli-
gence in determining whether a woman consented is sufficient 
to secure a rape conviction.37 The proposed revisions to the 
Model Penal Code, discussed in Part V.A. below, explicitly 
adopt an affirmative consent requirement.38   
Notwithstanding these changes, the number of rape re-
ports that lead to arrest has declined significantly since 1970.39 
 
 31. Michelle J. Anderson, Negotiating Sex, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1417 
(2005) (citing studies).  
 32. Katharine K. Baker & Michelle Oberman, Women’s Sexual Agency and 
the Law of Rape in the 21st Century, STUD. L. POL. & SOC’Y (forthcoming) 
(manuscript at 3) (on file with author).  
 33. Anderson, supra note 31, at 1405.  
 34. Six states define consent as positive cooperation. ALI Draft, supra 
note 23, at 41. In Wisconsin, the crime is defined as sexual intercourse with a 
person without the consent of that person, with consent being defined as 
“words or overt actions by a person who is competent to give informed consent 
indicating a freely given agreement . . . .” WIS. STAT. § 940.225 (4) (2013). 
Florida defines rape as sex without “intelligent, knowing and voluntary con-
sent . . . .” FLA. STAT. § 794.011(1)(a) (2014). In Washington, consent is defined 
to mean “that at the time of the act of sexual intercourse or sexual contact 
there are actual words or conduct indicating freely given agreement to have 
sexual intercourse or sexual contact.” WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.010(7) (2008).  
 35. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67386(a) (West 2015). California did not adopt 
an affirmative consent standard into its criminal code generally. 
 36. See, e.g., State v. Reid, 479 A.2d 1291, 1293 (Me. 1984); Common-
wealth v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961, 962 (Mass. 2001); State ex rel. M.T.S., 609 
A.2d 1266, 1267 (N.J. 1992). 
 37. Stephen Schulhofer, Rape-Law Reform Circa 2002: Has the Pendulum 
Swung Too Far?, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. SCI. 276, 282 (2003).  
 38. See infra Part V.A. 
 39. See Corey Rayburn Yung, Rape Law Fundamentals 43 (Feb. 2, 2014) 
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_ 
id=2337621. 
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Conviction rates have not increased.40 The Department of Jus-
tice reports that 20% of women on college campuses have been 
victims of sexual assault, but very few of them bring charges.41 
Despite all the reform, the criminal law does not appear to be 
actively punishing vast amounts of nonconsensual sex.  
C. THE RE-EMERGENCE OF FORCE 
Recently, in a much critiqued article, Professor Jed 
Rubenfeld rejected the feminist/liberal construction of rape’s in-
jury.42 Using the law’s reticence to treat sex secured by decep-
tion as rape,43 Rubenfeld argues that it cannot be overriding the 
victim’s will with regard to how the sexual parts of her body are 
touched that constitutes the gravamen of rape. If the law really 
saw that as injury, it would punish sex secured by deception 
because everywhere else in the law, fraud vitiates consent.44 In-
stead, Rubenfeld argues, the injury of rape results from a com-
bination of force and sex that takes away the victim’s self-
control. Sex that is secured through force violates a victim’s 
right to “self-possession,”45 as do slavery and torture. Sex se-
 
 40. Id. at 43–44; see Spohn, supra note 5, at 129. 
 41. CHRISTOPHER P. KREBS ET AL., NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE 
SERV. THE CAMPUS SEXUAL ASSAULT STUDY: FINAL REPORT XIII (Oct. 2007), 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/grants/221153.pdf. This figure is controversial, 
but it is “not out of line with what is reported by other studies.” See Marc Per-
ry, Behind the Statistics on Campus Rape: Research Is More Nuanced than 
Easy Numbers Imply, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 9, 2015), http://chronicle 
.com/article/Behind-the-Statistics-on/151089 (quoting rape researcher Mary P. 
Koss).  
 42. See Rubenfeld, supra note 6. Yale Law Journal Online published a fo-
rum after Rubenfeld’s article came out, in which Professors Tom Dougherty, 
Patricia Falk, Gowri Ramachandran, and Deborah Tuerkheimer all took issue 
with Rubenfeld’s insistence on force. See YALE L.J., http://www.yalelawjournal 
.org/forum/ (follow “volume 123” hyperlink; then scroll down to collection of 
articles responding to Jed Rubenfeld) (last visited Oct. 17, 2015); see also Kiel 
Brennan-Marquez, A Quite Principled Conceit, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 83 (2013) 
(arguing that all criminal statutes involve imperfect line-drawing and 
Rubenfeld’s line, which he draws with the concept of self-possession, is no bet-
ter at capturing our intuitions than is the line drawn by invoking the concept 
of sexual autonomy); Sherry Colb, The Role of Consent in Defining Rape, DORF 
ON LAW (May 1, 2013), http://www .dorfonlaw.org/2013/05/the-role-of-consent 
-in-definingrape.html (saying no should be enough, because once someone has 
said no and the other person does not stop, there is an implicit threat in place); 
Yung, supra note 39.  
 43. Rape-by-deception usually involves a man impersonating another man 
or claiming to be someone that he is not. See Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 1375–
76.  
 44. Id. at 1376.  
 45. Id. at 1434. 
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cured without force does not result in a comparable injury. For 
Rubenfeld, rape is forcible rape.46 Everything else—sex with an 
intoxicated person, sex with an unconscious or underage per-
son, sex with someone who just lies there—if it should be crim-
inalized at all, is something other than rape.47 
By (re)making force an essential part of rape, Rubenfeld 
solves two of the biggest practical problems to confront criminal 
enforcement of contemporary rape law. First, force is exceed-
ingly useful in establishing lack of consent. Just as the re-
sistance requirement helped establish force, so the force re-
quirement helped establish lack of consent. In the absence of 
writings or witnesses or videotape,48 jurors have very little way 
of determining that someone did not consent to an act.49 Force 
makes that clear. Second, force helps establish that the alleged 
rapist knew that the victim was not consenting. In a context in 
which ambiguity and wordlessness are celebrated as passion, a 
potential defendant can have a very difficult time discerning 
consent. But he almost certainly knows whether he used force.  
 
 46. This is an obvious, if implicit rejection of Professor Susan Estrich’s ar-
gument of 30 years ago. See SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 5–7 (1987) (arguing 
that “simple rape” by a man who does not expressly use or threaten force with 
a woman whom he knows is “real rape”). Professor Rubenfeld’s position also 
aligns him with a hapless bunch of Tea Party candidates who ran into trouble 
trying to explain what they thought “real rape” was. See Gowri 
Ramachandran, Delineating the Heinous: Rape, Sex, and Self-Possession, 123 
YALE L.J. ONLINE 371, 372 (2013), http://yalelawjournal.org/2013/12/1/ 
ramachandran.html.  
 47. Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 1435–42 (discussing why sex with uncon-
scious, drunk, and underage “partners” should not be considered rape). 
Rubenfeld appears sometimes to argue that these acts should be treated as 
batteries, id. at 1440 (“[S]exual penetration of an unconscious stranger (or 
mere acquaintance) . . . is a crime under traditional assault-and-battery law.”), 
but at other times suggest that criminal prohibitions on this sort of activity 
are inevitably too broad. See infra note 50.  
 48. The existence of videotape can even fail to establish the consent ques-
tion definitively. See infra text accompanying notes 82–87.  
 49. Lack of consent is difficult whether the law uses a subjective or objec-
tive standard. If courts interpret the question of consent to be only about the 
alleged victim’s state of mind, whatever her outward manifestations, it is par-
ticularly difficult to prove. But even if courts instruct juries, or juries believe, 
that lack of consent must be established objectively, such that it is clear that 
consent was absent or ambiguous, establishing those facts beyond a reasona-
ble doubt is very difficult. See Schulhofer, supra note 37, at 284–85 (discussing 
the objective and subjective standards and noting that neither party is likely 
telling the complete truth); infra Part II (discussing the difficulties in securing 
a sexual assault conviction).  
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Rubenfeld does not ground his conceptualization of rape 
law in arguments about enforceability or culpability, though.50 
He grounds his argument in the nature of the injury.51 Applying 
his theory to the problem of sexual assault on college campuses, 
he argues that attempts like DOE’s to enforce broader under-
standings of assault using lesser standards of proof will exacer-
bate what he sees as the fundamental problem: “that almost no 
college rapists are criminally punished,” because victims go 
through a college process, not the criminal law.52 He suggests 
that the college process should be integrated with law enforce-
ment, not distinct from it, so that those who actually commit 
rape (that is, in Rubenfeld’s view, those who use force) will be 
criminally punished.  
The analysis that follows explains why Professor Rubenfeld 
and other DOE critics’ faith in the criminal process to adjudi-
 
 50. His argument against criminalizing some forms of nonconsensual sex 
may be grounded in culpability. He argues that attempts to prohibit non-
forceful nonconsensual sex are so overbroad that they criminalize behavior 
that is commonplace, like drunk people having sex or touching another’s sexu-
al organs while sleeping. See Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 1442 (discussing sex-
ual contact involving intoxication); id. at 1440 (discussing sexual contact dur-
ing sleep).  
 51. Most of the criticism of Rubenfeld has come from those who cannot 
accept his argument that the harm from unconsented to sex is insufficiently 
grave to warrant punishment as a rapist. Critics argue that the harm from 
coerced sex in which no force was used can be just as devastating as the harm 
from a typical forced rape. See Brennan-Marquez, supra note 42, at 82 (argu-
ing that in the end Rubenfeld’s framework relies on intuitions about what 
should be criminalized (sex by deception should not), but to get there 
Rubenfeld excludes other acts that many people’s intuitions suggest should be 
considered rape, i.e., when the victim is unconscious, asleep, or very intoxicat-
ed); Falk, supra note 24, at 360–62 (detailing the many instances in which be-
havior that Rubenfeld would not term rape harms victims). Others argue that 
knotty questions of consent cannot be avoided under Rubenfeld’s definition, 
because even if we frame the issue in terms of self-possession, there is the 
question of whether one consented to the loss of possession. Tom 
Dougherty, No Way Around Consent: A Reply to Rubenfeld on “Rape-by-
Deception,” 123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 321, 325–26 (2013), http://www.yalelaw 
journal.org/forum/no-way-around-consent-a-reply-to-rubenfeld-on-rape-by 
-deception. Moreover, it is arguably not rape but sex itself that leads one to 
lose a sense of being self-possessed. This may be particularly true for women, 
for whom a great deal of consensual sexual activity inevitably involves an in-
vasion of the self. Women are quite used to “no longer [being] their own per-
son,” see Rubenfeld, supra note 6, at 1430, whether during sex or during preg-
nancy. See Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 34–35 
(1988) (suggesting that for most women, in pregnancy and in intercourse, the 
sense of being invaded, possessed by another, is commonplace—for men, it is 
very rare).  
 52. See Rubenfeld, supra note 6. 
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cate and punish sexual assault is misplaced. But the mere 
presence of Rubenfeld’s article, and the uproar around it, indi-
cate that rape reformers were not as successful as hoped in 
changing norms with regard to what is criminal behavior. The 
law changed, but many people, including prominent criminal 
law scholars, still reject the notion that nonconsensual sex is 
rape. It is hardly surprising, then, that a tremendous amount 
of nonconsensual sex goes unpunished.  
II.  THE (ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE) ROAD TO 
CONVICTION   
The first major impediment for the rape reform movement 
had to do with problems of proof. For a while now, commenta-
tors have recognized how hard it can be to prove nonconsensual 
sex between acquaintances.53 Stranger rape, in which the oper-
ative question is not usually whether consensual sexual activity 
occurred but who perpetrated an obviously nonconsensual act, 
is now exceedingly easy to prove. Thanks to DNA evidence, the-
se cases are virtually never tried anymore.54 Assuming appro-
priately followed police procedure, a rape kit tells us with cer-
tainty that a particular man’s semen was found in a particular 
victim’s body. That man pleads guilty to something because 
there is no way he can overcome the scientific proof linking him 
to a crime. His only potential defense is consent—but that is 
too implausible in the paradigmatic stranger rape scenario.  
Once there is a plausible story of consent, though, the prob-
lems of proof become paramount. In an age when hook-ups are 
the norm for college students,55 when sex on first dates is com-
 
 53. See, e.g., David P. Bryden & Sonja Lengnick, Rape in the Criminal 
Justice System, 87 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1194, 1316–17 (1997) (discussing 
prosecutorial difficulty in proving non-consent beyond a reasonable doubt); see 
also Katharine K. Baker, Sex, Rape, and Shame, 79 B.U. L. REV. 663, 690 
(1999) (explaining that the circumstances surrounding date rape often make it 
difficult to prove non-consent beyond a reasonable doubt).  
 54. See Brandon Garrett, Judging Innocence, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 55, 74–
75 nn.73–75, 75 (2008) (analyzing and citing studies showing that the plea 
bargain rate for felony rape convictions is 90%, as compared with a 51% plea 
bargain rate for felony murder); see also D. Michael Risnger, Innocents Con-
victed: An Empirically Justified Factual Wrongful Conviction Rate, 97 J. CRIM. 
L. & CRIMINOLOGY 761, 786 (2007) (discussing how DNA technology has re-
duced the prevalence of false identifications, which are likely to be challenged 
in court, in rape cases). 
 55. Between 60–80% of North American college students report having 
some hook-up experience. See Justin R. Garcia et al., Sexual Hookup Culture: 
A Review, 16 REV. GEN. PSYCHOL. 161, 163 (2012). 
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mon, and when many people celebrate the liberating opportuni-
ties of sex without relationship,56 there are many reasons to be-
lieve an alleged victim might have consented. Often, alleged 
rapes start with consensual touching.57 Sometimes there has 
been consensual intercourse before. In a surprising number of 
cases there is consensual intercourse afterwards, even if the 
victim perceived the earlier incident as rape.58 Sexual activity, 
whether coerced or not, usually takes place in private. There is 
usually no tangible evidence of non-consent. Everyone concedes 
that intercourse took place.  
The victim’s story is all the prosecution has. The defend-
ant, if well-represented, does not have to take the stand. There-
fore, whether he remembers everything perfectly, whether he 
has ever lied before, whether he is the “type” of person who 
might have done the opposite of what he claims, does not have 
to be at issue. Meanwhile, because the victim usually must 
take the stand, her memory, her credibility, and her character 
are inevitably at issue; she is the only proof.59 
The circumstances in which rapes occur and the sexual na-
ture of the crime make it likely that she will be a bad witness. 
The vast majority of acquaintance rapes involve people who 
have been drinking alcohol,60 thus their memories are likely to 
 
 56. HANNA ROSIN, THE END OF MEN 25–40 (2012) (arguing that contem-
porary women are liberated from oppressive relationships when given the 
freedom to hook-up); Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E. Rothman, Sex in and 
out of Intimacy, 59 EMORY L.J. 809, 853 (2010) (arguing that sex without inti-
macy or relationship affords women freedom that has been denied to them in 
relationships).  
 57. See In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183, 184–85 (Cal. 2003) (describing a case 
where a victim initially consented to some sexual contact but then withdrew 
consent); R. Lance Shotland, A Theory of Courtship Rape: Part 2, 48 J. SOC. 
ISSUES 127, 129 (1992) (describing initially consensual behavior that turns in-
to rape).  
 58. See Melissa J. Layman et al., Unacknowledged Versus Acknowledged 
Rape Victims: Situational Factors and Posttraumatic Stress, 105 J. ABNORMAL 
PSYCHOL. 124, 127 (reporting that 10% of victims who acknowledged being 
raped had sex with the perpetrator afterwards; 32% of victims who did not 
acknowledge what happened to them as rape had sex with the perpetrator af-
terwards).  
 59. Evidence rules allow any witness’ credibility to be impeached. See 
FED. R. EVID. 607, 608. If a defendant never testifies, his credibility is not 
openly questioned.  
 60. See Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 53, at 1350 (citing earlier studies 
showing between 75–90% of sexual assaults on college campuses involve alco-
hol); Meichun Mohler-Kuo et al., Correlates of Rape While Intoxicated in a Na-
tional Sample of College Women, 65 J. STUD. ON ALCOHOL 37, 40 (2004) (stat-
ing that 72% of college rape victims reported being intoxicated during the 
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be fuzzy. Even without alcohol, rape victims “tend to have less 
clear and vivid memories than people with other types of trau-
matic or unpleasant experiences.”61 Indeed, blocking out the 
event from one’s memory has been found to be a healthy psy-
chological response. It helps diminish the ongoing trauma that 
rape victims suffer.62 In other words, the healthier the victim, 
the worse she is as a witness.63  
Even if victims can recall what happened, even if they did 
not just close their eyes and cry,64 it can be very difficult to de-
scribe what happened. Most people are not used to describing 
their sex lives in detail, if at all. To be asked to do so, under 
oath, with one’s description subject to vigorous scrutiny not on-
ly by defense counsel but by a group of twelve strangers, can be 
daunting.65  
There is only so much that rape shield laws can place off-
limits in a trial.66 No court is going to exclude the victim’s past 
 
rape).  
 61. Arthur Garrison, Rape Trauma Syndrome: A Review of a Behavioral 
Science Theory and Its Admissibility in Criminal Trials, 23 AM. J. TRIAL 
ADVOC. 591, 625 (2000). 
 62. Id.  
 63. For those familiar with this data, there was a telltale sign that the in-
famous Rolling Stone article, which was later retracted because the victim’s 
story appears to have been highly inaccurate, was wrong. The reporter wrote 
that the victim “remember[ed] every moment of the three hours of agony.” Sa-
brina Rubin Erdely, A Rape on Campus: A Brutal Assault and Struggle for 
Justice at UVA, ROLLING STONE (Nov. 19, 2014), http://web.archive.org/web/ 
20141123012328/http://www.rollingstone.com/culture/features/a-rape-on 
-campus-20141119. Those who work with rape victims know that it is very un-
likely that a victim would remember every moment. See Garrison, supra note 
61.  
 64. Professor Estrich described her own rape and how difficult it can be to 
recollect the incident for the police when they ask. She reflected that “no one 
[tells you] that if you’re raped, you should not shut your eyes and cry for fear 
that this really is happening.” ESTRICH, supra note 46, at 2.  
 65. See, e.g., Walt Bogdanich, Reporting Rape, and Wishing She Hadn’t: 
Inside One College’s Response When a Student Came Forward, N.Y. TIMES, 
July 13, 2014, at 15 (“It was one of the hardest things I have ever gone 
through . . . I felt like I was talking to someone who knew nothing [about] any 
sort of social interaction; what happens at parties; what happens in sex.”); 
Richard Pérez-Peña & Kate Taylor, Fight Against Sex Assaults Holds Colleges 
to Account, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 2014, at 1 (reporting that one Columbia Uni-
versity student commented that when she had to testify about how she was 
raped anally, she “had to tell an embarrassing story and then teach [the uni-
versity panel] an embarrassing subject . . . [which] felt really gross”).  
 66. Bryden & Lengnick, supra note 53, at 1287 (“[S]ome sorts of evidence 
about the complainant’s character and habits will inevitably be available to 
the jury.”). 
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sexual behavior with the alleged perpetrator.67 No court will ex-
clude incidents about which she may have lied in the past.68 No 
court can make it easy for her to talk about her own embar-
rassment, possible fear, and sense of powerlessness during a 
sexual encounter.69 Her comfort with her own sexuality, her ex-
perience and familiarity with certain acts and sensations will 
be on display whether she wants them to be or not.  
Consider the well-publicized recent case of Army Brigadier 
General Jeffrey A. Sinclair. General Sinclair had what every-
one acknowledged was a three-year affair with a female captain 
under his command. The woman’s complaint alleged that dur-
ing the affair, the general forced her to have oral sex. Her story 
was that “[w]ith the relationship becoming increasingly stormy, 
General Sinclair one day walked into her office in Afghanistan, 
unbuttoned his pants, grabbed her by the neck and forced her 
to fellate him.”70 She testified that “I know I didn’t pull away 
from him, but I didn’t want to do it.”71 The Army’s case against 
the general collapsed.  
Even if the woman had no history of lying and no previous 
testimony that was subject to impeachment, this would be an 
exceedingly difficult case to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 
Indeed, General Sinclair could have been much more violent. 
He could have started to choke her;72 he could have pinned her; 
he could have pulled her arm across her back and threatened to 
break it and then demanded that she perform sexual acts on 
him. None of these hypothetical acts would leave proof of rape 
but no one—not even Professor Rubenfeld73—would suggest 
 
 67. See FED. R. EVID. 412(b)(1)(B) (providing a specific exception for con-
sensual sex with the accused).  
 68. See FED. R. EVID. 608.  
 69. And what if she has felt all of those sensations during consensual sex? 
Is it her responsibility to still articulate the difference? If she has difficulty do-
ing so, does that mean she has not been injured? See infra Part IV.A. 
 70. Alan Blinder & Richard Oppel Jr., How a Military Sexual Assault 
Case Foundered, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2014, at A19. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Choking and strangulation tend to leave minimal signs of injury and 
are risk factors for later violence. Maureen Funk & Julie Schuppel, Strangula-
tion Injuries, 102 WIS. MED. J. 41, 43 (2003); Kathryn Laughon et al., Revision 
of the Abuse Assessment Screen to Address Nonlethal Strangulation, 37 J. OB-
STETRIC GYNECOLOGIC & NEONATAL NURSING 502, 502–05 (2008). The victim 
in the Sinclair case also alleged that the accused threatened to kill her if she 
told his wife about their affair. See Blinder & Oppel, supra note 70.  
 73. See supra Part I.C. 
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that they were not rape. Yet the law would likely not have been 
able to punish General Sinclair for any of it.  
The defense’s attacks on her credibility would be the same 
no matter how bad her allegations: she was a jealous lover who 
wanted to hurt “the wife”; she wanted to retaliate against him 
for ending the relationship; she was accusing him of rape to 
protect herself from a charge of adultery (which can be illegal 
in the military); she had loved him.74 Like many victims of rape, 
she had consensual sex with him again.75 All of that makes her 
a bad witness. Unless there was demonstrable evidence of force 
or witnesses that heard him threaten, the prosecution had 
nothing but her word on which to rely.  
The reason this case fell so completely apart was not be-
cause it became clear that what she alleged happened did not 
happen. What became clear is that the prosecution could not 
prove it. The biggest blow to the Army was not a piece of evi-
dence suggesting that her account of the rape was untrue, but 
that she had previously lied about the existence of a cell phone 
containing (redundant) proof that the affair had been consen-
sual. The cell phone was a smoking gun with regard to the wit-
ness’s overall credibility, not a smoking gun with regard to the 
facts of what was alleged.  
For better or worse, evidence rules allow fact finders to 
make overall credibility determinations about witnesses based 
on what those witnesses have said in the past.76 The trial judge 
sanctioned the Army officials for letting politics blind them to 
what any experienced prosecutor should have known—and the 
original prosecutor who resigned from the case appears to have 
known—that the case could not be won with a witness who had 
a credibility problem.77 Victim credibility is all there is in a case 
like this.  
 
 74. All of these arguments were made by the defense in the Sinclair case. 
See Blinder & Oppel, supra note 70.  
 75. See Garrison, supra note 61, at 616.  
 76. See generally FED. R. EVID. 608 (allowing character evidence for truth-
fulness even though the rules disallow character evidence for other traits).  
 77. The military judge stopped the court-martial and ordered parties to 
work out a settlement indicating that the Army’s decision to prosecute the 
General had been motivated too much by politics and not enough by the reali-
ties of the case. The original chief prosecutor for the Army resigned from the 
case under protest because his superiors continued to press for the most seri-
ous charges against his will. Blinder & Oppel, supra note 70, at A1, A19.  
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This problem of having to rely so completely on the victim’s 
credibility has nothing to do with police or prosecutors not be-
lieving in the harms of acquaintance rape. It has nothing to do 
with the law trying to push juries to effectuate social change 
too abruptly.78 It has little to do with women as a class not be-
ing believed. Throughout the General Sinclair saga, the Army 
maintained that it believed the woman. The problem is that 
rape is a crime that by its nature has no witnesses, produces no 
demonstrable evidence, and inevitably brings with it a perfectly 
plausible theory of legality, i.e., consent. The crime also in-
volves, indeed the essence of the injury stems from, an act that 
most people find very difficult to talk about.  
Consider also the case of a Columbia University student 
profiled in the New York Times.79 She alleged that a friend, 
with whom she had had consensual sex twice, raped her. She 
recounted to the university tribunal that one evening she will-
ingly let the accused man accompany her back to her room from 
a party but shortly after getting there: 
[He] grabbed her wrists and pinned her arms behind her head. He 
pushed her legs against her chest and forcefully penetrated her anus. 
They had never had anal sex before. They had never discussed it. It 
was painful. S[he] began to struggle, screaming at him to stop, yelling 
at him to get off of her. He didn’t stop. 
Afterwards, he lay next to her for a few seconds. They didn’t 
speak. He abruptly got out of bed, gathered his clothes, and walked 
out the door, leaving a handle of vodka behind him.80   
This is a perfectly plausible story. There is nothing about 
her narrative that suggests that she is lying or misremember-
ing anything—even though she acknowledged that she was, 
understandably, nervous and uncomfortable—when reciting 
the facts to university officials. The problem is that it is incred-
ibly easy for the alleged perpetrator or his defense team to tell 
a comparably plausible story, an almost-comparably-plausible 
story, or a story that even if unlikely, might be true. As long as 
he, or his defense team, tell any of those competing stories in a 
 
 78. Professor Dan Kahan has written about the dangers of trying to 
change social norms—particularly entrenched social norms—too quickly. See 
Dan Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Prob-
lem, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 623–25 (2000) (suggesting societal norms contrib-
uted to the ineffectiveness of rape law reforms).  
 79. Pérez-Peña & Taylor, supra note 65. 
 80. Anna Bahr, Accessible, Prompt, and Equitable?: An Examination of 
Sexual Assault at Columbia, BLUE & WHITE, Feb. 2014, at 17, http://static1 
.squarespace.com/static/545d1072e4b043f3abfccc09/t/549efd16e4b0be677c08d3
a1/1419705622273/February+2014+Issue.pdf.  
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remotely credible manner, the criminal burden of proof entitles 
him to a finding of not guilty.81  
Even when there is corroborating evidence, proof problems 
abound. In 2006, an Illinois high school student accused Adrian 
Missbrenner and several other men of rape after she learned 
there was a videotape of them having sex with her while she 
was very intoxicated.82 In this case, the victim did not have to 
take the stand. She let the tape testify for her. The tape showed 
three older boys having sex with her and scribbling obscenities 
on her body. There was undisputed evidence that the victim 
had been drinking, and by the end of the video, she was clearly 
unconscious. Prosecutors argued that the tape was proof that 
the victim was too intoxicated to consent to intercourse. The ju-
ry acquitted Missbrenner. 
The tape was in three segments.83 In the first, the girl is 
heard making sounds and (possibly) talking while having sex 
with the first man. In the second part, the one in which 
Missbrenner appears penetrating her, prosecutors argued that 
the girl’s eyes were closed and she was listless. In the third 
segment, the victim is unconscious. It is in the third segment 
that the men wrote sexual slurs and spit on her body.84 To the 
jurors, it was unclear how soon after Missbrenner’s intercourse 
the last segment was taped.85  
Notably, one juror said, “I think they should still go for the 
civil trial. There’s a different set of standards there.”86 “Clearly 
we knew what those young men did was wrong. Clearly, they 
took advantage of her. But there was reasonable doubt.”87 Rape 
jurors take reasonable doubt seriously. After an acquittal in an 
 
 81. Universities are not bound to use the criminal burden, see infra Part 
V.B.1.b, but the Columbia tribunal still found the evidence of assault too inde-
terminate to hold the defendant responsible. See Pérez-Peña & Taylor, supra 
note 65, at 1, 22. 
 82. Burr Ridge Man Acquitted in Rape Case, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 4, 
2006.  
 83. No one except the prosecutors, the defense, the judge, and the jurors 
saw the videotape, but it was described sufficiently for reporters to learn about 
the segments and what was in them. See Christy Gutowski, Juror Says Case 
“Insult Not Assault” Tape Shows Naperville Girl Was a “Willing Participant,” 
Woman Says, CHIC. DAILY HERALD, Mar. 18, 2005. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id.  
 86. John Bisognano, Juror: Tape Key to Verdict; Foreman in Rape Case 
Says There Was Doubt, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 9, 2006, at 2C.1.  
 87. Id. 
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Army sexual misconduct trial several years before the 
Missbrenner case, a juror explained, “it’s not that we didn’t be-
lieve the women; it’s that we had reasonable doubt.”88   
A California judge who tried California v. John Z.,89 a text-
book case of complicated consent,90 voiced comparable concerns. 
John Z. is notable for the California Supreme Court’s willing-
ness to affirm the trial court’s finding of rape even though the 
victim testified that she said yes before she said no. The case 
was tried by a judge without a jury, and the judge made a find-
ing of force, presumably because the defendant pushed the girl 
onto the bed.91 In a subsequent interview, the judge opined that 
a jury probably would not have found the defendant guilty as 
he did, and he was not sure that he himself would convict again 
on identical facts.92 The prosecution’s appellate lawyer assigned 
to defend the verdict on appeal expressed comparable doubts.93 
Several experienced sex crimes prosecutors, when asked their 
opinion about this case, expressed shock that the prosecution 
had gone forward. They thought it was too hard to win.94 
 
 88. All Things Considered: McKinney Juror Speaks, NPR (Mar. 19, 1998) 
(Interview by Robert Siegel & Noah Adams with Martha Raddatz), http://www 
.npr.org/programs/all-thingsconsidered/1998/03/19/12966073/?showDate=1998 
-03-19.  
 89. In re John Z., 60 P.3d 183 (Cal. 2003). This case is reproduced in many 
casebooks also because the woman acknowledged saying yes before she said 
no.  
 90. John Z. involved two boys having sex with a seventeen year-old girl. 
The boys had been drinking. The girl had not. It was not videotaped. See 
Michelle Oberman, Two Truths and a Lie: In re John Z. and Other Stories at 
the Juncture of Teen Sex and the Law, 38 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 364 (2013) 
(providing an in-depth description of the case and the lawyers and judges in-
volved in it). John Z. used to be featured in the most popularly used Criminal 
Law casebook, the fifth edition of Joshua Dressler’s Cases and Materials on 
Criminal Law. Though it was removed in the most recent edition, the authors 
continue to contemplate putting it back in and continue to reference the case 
and Professor Oberman’s article. E-mail from Joshua Dressler, Distinguished 
Univ. Professor, Ohio State Univ. Moritz Coll. of Law, to Katharine Baker, 
Professor of Law, Chi.-Kent Coll. of Law (June 10, 2015, 1:31 PM) (on file with 
author). 
 91. See Oberman, supra note 90, at 386. 
 92. See id. at 386–87 (describing an interview with the trial judge). 
 93. Id. at 389 (“I don’t lose any sleep over ninety-nine percent of [the cases 
being prosecuted]. . . . This case is in the one percent of uncertainty for me.”).  
 94. Id. at 375–76 (describing experienced prosecutors wondering how the 
case ever made it through the prosecutor’s screening process with “so many 
proof problems”). 
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John Z. and the recent convictions in the videotaped case 
from Steubenville, Ohio,95 show that occasionally the law can do 
what reformers wanted. It can criminalize nonconsensual sex 
qua nonconsensual sex.96 But these cases also show how ex-
traordinarily difficult it is to convict. The high school girl on the 
videotape in Steubenville was unconscious the entire time.97 
Both cases were tried in juvenile court to a judge, not a jury. 
That’s one finder of fact to convince, not twelve. Judges are also 
trained to apply the law as written. They should be much less 
likely than lay jurors to let preconceived notions of “what rape 
is” affect their judgment.  
The standard feminist critique of why rape reform has not 
resulted in more convictions is that police and prosecutors fail 
to prosecute the law as written.98 But police and prosecutors 
should not be blamed for failure to prosecute that which they 
cannot prove. Indeed, the Army prosecutors in the Sinclair case 
were sanctioned for proceeding with a case that they should 
have known they could not adequately prove.99  
The feminist defense of rape reform has focused on the 
normative propriety of making consent the defining line be-
tween rape and sex, but feminists have arguably paid too little 
attention to the practical difficulty of making consent the cen-
tral issue. The problem is not, as the normative debate sug-
gests, that by requiring evidence of consent the law is killing 
the spontaneity, ruining the romance, and demanding cold 
 
 95. For a description of the case, see Juliet Macur & Nate Schweber, Rape 
Case Unfolds on Web and Splits City, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2012, at D1. The 
incident was also covered extensively on cable news. See, e.g., Erik Wemple, 
CNN Is Getting Hammered for Stuebenville Coverage, WASH. POST (Mar. 18, 
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/erik-wemple/wp/2013/03/18/cnn 
-is-getting-hammered-for-steubenville-coverage.  
 96. There was a finding of force in John Z., but it was minimal (pushing 
the victim back down on a bed). See Oberman, supra note 90, at 386.  
 97. Macur & Schweber, supra note 95. 
 98. See generally ROSE CORRIGAN, UP AGAINST A WALL: RAPE REFORM 
AND THE FAILURE OF SUCCESS 80–100 (2013) (ebook) (finding that police and 
prosecutors often do not take rape claims seriously); Lynn Hecht Schafran, 
Writing and Reading About Rape: A Primer, 66 ST. JOHN’S L. REV 979, 1010–
11 (1993) (articulating that the police and prosecutors “unfound” cases that 
did not fit into the stranger rape paradigm); Morrison Torrey, When Will We 
Be Believed? Rape Myths and the Idea of a Fair Trial in Rape Prosecutions, 24 
U. CAL. DAVIS L. REV. 1013 (1991) (detailing the ways in which police, prose-
cutors, and jurors refuse to believe women).  
 99. The court-martial judge reprimanded Army officials for letting the po-
litical pressure to enforce sexual assault rules cloud their judgment of whether 
this was an appropriate case to press. See Blinder & Oppel, supra note 70.  
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hard contracts for sex.100 Those claims are readily dismissed be-
cause (1) talking about sex does not necessarily ruin it,101 and 
(2) women’s safety is far more important than men’s dreams of 
romance.102 The problem is that it does limited good to change 
the law to require communication of consent if no one can prove 
what is required. It may even be damaging to ask the law to do 
something that in the vast majority of appropriate cases, it 
cannot do.  
The result is that cases either are not pursued103 or they 
are pursued but do not result in convictions. What kind of mes-
sage does the result in the Missbrenner case send to young men 
who have the opportunity to take advantage of a not completely 
unconscious woman? What kind of message does the collapse of 
the Army’s case in Sinclair send to women who might come 
forward with allegations of rape by a superior officer? Would 
anyone, should anyone, tell the Columbia student to pursue 
criminal charges given how extraordinarily unlikely it would be 
for the prosecution to be able to secure a conviction? Without 
more convictions based on the new understanding of what rape 
is, people will not come to understand the underlying behavior 
as criminal. The criminal law is not punishing a vast amount of 
nonconsensual sex because the law cannot prove that it hap-
pened.104   
 
 100. See Neil Gilbert, The Phantom Epidemic of Sexual Assault, 103 PUB. 
INT. 54, 60 (1991); George F. Will, Sex Amidst the Semicolons, NEWSWEEK, 
Oct. 4, 1992, at 92. 
 101. Jason Vest, The School that Put Sex to the Test: At Antioch, a Passion-
ate Reaction to Consent Code, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1993, at G1 (reporting that 
sex continues to be a regular part of life at Antioch College despite the manda-
tory communication-before-sex requirement); see also Jane Gross, Combating 
Rape on Campus in a Class on Sexual Consent, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 1993, at 
A1. 
 102. See Baker, supra note 53 (“[T]here is a mystery and spontaneity to 
non-verbal communication . . . but it can also be very dangerous.”); Lynne 
Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 LAW & PHIL. 127, 162 (1992) (finding 
that much of women’s “fear, shame, and anger” at being assaulted could be 
“easily avoided” with communication); see also ALI Draft, supra note 23 (as-
suming consent when there is none or giving a “false positive[]” presents a far 
greater danger than assuming no consent or giving a “false negative[]”).  
 103. Oberman, supra note 90 (explaining that experienced prosecutors 
would not have pursued the John Z. case because of victim hardship and the 
small chance of success); see also William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics 
of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 570 (2001) (discussing prosecutor dis-
incentives for cases that are difficult to prove).  
 104. People may believe, beyond a reasonable doubt, that these men are 
doing something wrong. Rape reformers can take some comfort in that what 
had once been seen as inevitable or justifiable is now seen as unjustifiable. 
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III.  THE COMPETING CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE 
RAPIST   
The second major impediment for the rape reform move-
ment derives from competing constructions of rapists. As sug-
gested earlier, one of the primary goals of rape reform was to 
expand the amount of legally-proscribed sexual activity by en-
couraging the law and those who enforce it to see “sex” that 
was coerced, often by an acquaintance, without the use of a 
weapon or the infliction of other external injury, as “rape.”105 As 
Susan Estrich argued with the title of her book, the goal was to 
treat all kinds of rape as “Real Rape,”106 though many people 
realized that securing convictions for this new kind of rape 
would be difficult.107 The problem stemmed from just how com-
monplace acquaintance rapist behavior is. Significant numbers 
of men admit to having committed rape.108 Even more men ad-
mit to having coerced sex, when coercion is defined along a 
spectrum of ignoring women’s protests, to using physical 
force.109 Studies document that men rape without even realizing 
 
Rape reform may have shifted attitudes away from blaming women toward 
acknowledging the fault of the rapist. See Macur & Schweber, supra note 95 
(noting that people sympathetic to the football players in Steubenville even 
acknowledged that they were not being decent human beings). Compare 
Baker, supra note 26, at 587–88 (discussing prominent cases in which jurors 
or the public refused to blame the accused men because, although they 
acknowledged the accused men used force to secure sex, they thought the 
women deserved it), with Chuck Goudie, Outcome of Video Rape Case Is No 
Cause for Celebration, CHI. DAILY HERALD, Mar. 3, 2006 (articulating that 
Missbrenner’s own mother said that what her son did was not “nice”), and 
Gutowski, supra note 83 (explaining that jurors saw the behavior as wrong). 
But see Oberman, supra note 90, at 399 (explaining that no one whom Profes-
sor Oberman spoke to in her in-depth study of the John Z. case defended John 
Z.’s actions).  
 105. See supra Part I.B.  
 106. ESTRICH, supra note 46.  
 107. See infra text accompanying notes 117–19.  
 108. ROBIN WARSHAW, I NEVER CALLED IT RAPE: THE MS. REPORT ON REC-
OGNIZING, FIGHTING, AND SURVIVING DATE AND ACQUAINTANCE RAPE 21 
(1994); see also Mary P. Koss, Hidden Rape: Sexual Aggression and Victimiza-
tion in a National Sample of Students in Higher Education, in RAPE & SEXUAL 
ASSAULT II 3, 11 (Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., 1988) (finding that one in twelve 
men admitted to committing rape). This is a dated study, but given the num-
ber of sexual assaults that occur on college campuses today, a reduced finding 
would be surprising. E.g., Lauren Sieben, Education Dept. Issues New Guid-
ance for Sexual-Assault Violations, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Apr. 4, 2011), 
http://chronicle.com/article/Education-Dept-Issues-New/127004 (estimating 
that one in five women on college campuses are victims of sexual assault). 
 109. See Karen R. Rapaport & C. Dale Posey, Sexually Coercive College 
Males, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE, supra note 27, at 217, 219–20.  
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that they have.110 Men, understandably, confuse women’s pas-
sivity for consent because many men know that women can be 
passive even when they want to consent to sex.111 Men believe 
that women say no when they mean yes.112 And some women do 
say no when they mean yes.113  
In addition, men are expected to treat sex as a given in 
their lives, an obvious goal with a prize that enhances their 
masculinity in their own eyes and the eyes of others.114 Men are 
encouraged to compete with other men with regard to sexual 
conquests.115 It is thus all too obvious why men proceed with sex 
even if a woman does not expressly consent. Men are not 
taught to think of nonconsensual sex as an oxymoron, much 
less rape, so it is not surprising that men rape when the defini-
tion of rape is nonconsensual sex.116  
Rape reformers knew this. They knew that they were try-
ing to dismantle entrenched norms in gendered scripts that all 
too easily explained why acquaintance rape was so prevalent. 
They knew that they were indicting the status quo and trying 
to make it criminal. Professor Catharine MacKinnon opined, 
 
 110. Kanin, supra note 29.  
 111. See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 31, at 1416 (discussing women’s passiv-
ity); see also Baker, supra note 53, at 674 (recounting literature on how women 
are socialized to be passive); Andrew E. Taslitz, Patriarchal Stories I: Cultural 
Rape Narratives in the Courtroom, 5 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 387, 
440 (1996) (“Th[e] overriding theme of female silence as the mark of a good 
woman expresses itself in numerous variations in our general sexual culture 
. . . . She may speak if her voice soothes, entertains, informs, or otherwise 
helps to serve male needs. What she may not do is express her own needs or 
views . . . .”). 
 112. Henderson, supra note 102, at 141–42 (discussing the “no means yes” 
assumption); see also Oberman, supra note 90, at 394 (noting that in an honest 
conversation with the trial judge in the John Z. case, the judge acknowledged 
that as a kid he never would have taken the first “no” seriously).  
 113. One 1988 survey found that thirty-nine percent of women at a Texas 
university indicated that they did not want to have sex even though they did. 
Charlene L. Muehlenhard & Lisa C. Hollabaugh, Do Women Sometimes Say 
No When They Mean Yes? The Prevalence and Correlates of Women’s Token 
Resistance to Sex, 54 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 872, 872 (1988). 
 114. Baker, supra note 53, at 675–79 (discussing the link between sexual 
performance and idealized masculinity). 
 115. E.g., Baker, supra note 26, at 606 (examining instances where men 
used sexual conquests as a kind of competition with other men). 
 116. The rape reform movement included attempts to educate men about 
the harms of acquaintance rape, but studies conducted of college populations 
suggest that these training programs often fall short in transforming the way 
men think about potential hook-up partners. See Katharine K. Baker, Sex and 
Equality, 93 B.U. L. REV. ANNEX 663 (2013) (citing hook-up culture studies 
and how disregarding women’s desires is commonplace).   
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“when so many rapes involve honest men and violated wom-
en . . . is the woman raped but not by a rapist?”117 Susan Estrich 
advised, “[i]t is easier to condemn date rape than it is to punish 
date rapists.”118 Professor Lynne Henderson saw this as a retri-
bution/deterrence tradeoff. To really conflate acquaintance and 
stranger rapists was to say all rapists were deserving of the 
same severe penalty, but making the penalty that severe for a 
crime that was being perpetrated by so many peoples’ brothers 
and sons would inevitably lead to under-enforcement:  
Feminists are caught in a bind between the arguments for retributive 
punishment and deterrence of the crime of rape. Because all rape is a 
form of soul-murder, a life-threatening, and life-damaging experience, 
proportionality would seem to demand heavy penalties. . . . Practical-
ly, however, a patriarchal society will not tolerate imposition of heavy 
penalties on large numbers of men for raping women, at least in the 
short term.119   
Even as these reformers were analyzing the likely prob-
lems with making the commonplace criminal, there was a com-
peting, though superficially sympathetic, movement which 
sought to re-invigorate the notion that rapists—real rapists—
were particularly dangerous. The result was a series of tough-
on-rapists initiatives that undermined the reformist goal of ex-
panding the amount of legally proscribed activity.  
In 1994, Congress passed the Jacob Wetterling Crimes 
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration 
Program.120 This program predicated the receipt of federal mon-
ey for law enforcement on states developing registration sys-
tems for people convicted of certain sexual offenses. In 1997, 
Congress amended the Act to include a notification system, so 
not only did states have to develop systems for tracking those 
who had committed sexual offenses, they had to inform the 
public if someone who had committed such offenses was in its 
midst.121  
 
 117. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE 
STATE 183 (1989).  
 118. Susan Estrich, Palm Beach Stories, 11 LAW & PHIL. 5, 32–33 (1992).  
 119. Henderson, supra note 102, at 175–76. 
 120. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(a)(1) (West 2000) (repealed 2006). This Act and the 
state statutes it engendered are often named after victims. The most famous 
one may be New Jersey’s “Megan’s Law.” See Jenny A. Montana, Note, An In-
effective Weapon in the Fight Against Child Sexual Abuse: New Jersey’s Me-
gan’s Law, 3 J. L. & POL’Y 569, 569–71 (1995) (describing the New Jersey leg-
islation).  
 121. 42 U.S.C. § 14071(e)(2).  
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In enacting these registration and notification systems, 
state legislatures routinely relied on scientifically unsupported, 
but generally accepted, notions that rapists are uniquely recid-
ivistic and sexually perverse. Rapists are different, it was im-
plicitly argued, so they need special rules.122   
In reality, there is no evidence that rapists recidivate at a 
rate any higher than other criminals.123 Nor is there any sup-
porting evidence that most rapists are psychologically im-
paired.124 Registration and notification programs are rooted in 
an unsupported belief that rapists are “other”; that they are 
uniquely deviant. The rapid passage of registration and notifi-
cation laws125 demonstrates how easy it is to reify and exacer-
bate an understanding of rapists as psychopaths.  
Notification rules are especially pernicious in this regard. 
Being branded by the government and having one’s presence in 
a community announced because of that branding, obviously 
stigmatizes those who are branded. One study in Wisconsin 
found that notification routinely resulted in ostracization, har-
assment, and negative impacts on family and friends of the of-
fenders.126 No one denies this stigmatizing effect; it was just 
thought appropriate to the offense of rape and necessary in or-
der to protect the public from rapists.127  
 
 122. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1(a) (West 1994) (“The danger of re-
cidivism posed by sex offenders and . . . the dangers posed by persons who prey 
on others as a result of mental illness . . . .”), with N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168 
(McKinney 1998) (connecting the legislative findings and intent to the “danger 
of recidivism”).   
 123. See generally Christina E. Wells & Erin Elliott Motley, Reinforcing the 
Myth of the Crazed Rapist: A Feminist Critique of Recent Rape Legislation, 81 
B.U. L. REV. 127, 158 n.135 (2001) (citing a number of studies that found rap-
ists did not have higher recidivism rates than other types of offenders).  
 124. See Gene G. Abel, Judith V. Becker & Linda J. Skinner, Aggressive 
Behavior and Sex, 3 PSYCHIATRIC CLINICS N. AM. 133, 140 (1980) (asserting 
that less than five percent of rapists were psychotic at the time of the commis-
sion of rape); James V. P. Check & Neil Malamuth, An Empirical Assessment 
of Some Feminist Hypotheses About Rape, 8 INT’L J. WOMEN’S STUD. 414, 415 
(1985) (psychologists consistently fail to find evidence of abnormality among 
rapist populations); Paul Schewe & William O’Donohue, Rape Prevention: 
Methodological Problems and New Directions, 13 CLINICAL PSYCHIATRY REV. 
667, 668–72 (1993) (finding no significant psychological differences between 
rapist and nonrapist populations).  
 125. See Wells & Motley, supra note 123, at 132 n.22 (demonstrating that 
nearly all states now have very similar registration laws).  
 126. Richard G. Zevitz & Mary Ann Farkas, Sex Offender Community Noti-
fication: Managing High Risk Criminals or Exacting Further Vengeance, 18 
BEHAV. SCI. & L. 375, 381–84 (2000).  
 127. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:7-1(a); N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 168.  
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Yet many people do not feel the need to be protected from 
all the brothers and sons who expropriate sex from women 
without consent, nor do they likely see the need to stigmatize 
men who are conforming to social norms. When notification and 
registration laws validate the idea that rapists are uniquely 
dangerous it becomes much harder for everyone, from judge to 
juror to prosecutor to victim, to see the boy next door as a rap-
ist.128  
There are other parts of the conservative campaign that 
single rapists out as uniquely dangerous and thereby under-
mine the feminist attempts to indict the status quo. In the 
1990s, many states adopted special civil commitment proce-
dures for sexual predators,129 even though most of those states 
already had mechanisms in place that provided for civil com-
mitment of the mentally ill.130 This suggests (again, without 
any medical justification) that rapists are somehow uniquely 
mentally ill or, for some reason, worthy of civil commitment 
even in the absence of mental illness.131  
Comparably, in passing Federal Rules of Evidence 413–
415, which allow prior sexual offenses to be introduced in order 
to establish that the defendant has a sexual assaulter’s charac-
ter, Congress relied on the demonstrably false proposition that 
rapists constitute a “small class of depraved criminals.”132 Not 
only is there no evidence that rapists are rare or depraved, the 
rape reform movement that preceded the tough-on-rapists 
 
 128. Consider the response of the CNN reporters discussing the verdict in 
the Stuebenville rape case immediately after it came down, “the most severe 
thing with these young men is being labeled as sex offenders.” Wemple, supra 
note 95. 
 129. See Wells & Motley, supra note 123, at 135–37. 
 130. See Stephen Schulhofer, Two Systems of Social Protection: Comments 
on the Civil-Criminal Distinction, with Particular Reference to Sexually Vio-
lent Predator Laws, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 69, 94–96 (1996). 
 131. In upholding sexual predator statutes, the Supreme Court indicated 
that states could set their own criteria for determining who should be confined 
civilly. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 359–60 (1997).  
 132. See David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex Of-
fense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI-KENT L. REV. 15, 19–26 (1994). Mr. 
Karp’s views, originally expressed in a speech to the Association of American 
Law Schools, were referenced by the sponsors of FED. R. EVID. 413–15, Repre-
sentative Susan Molinari and Senator Bob Dole. See 140 CONG. REC. H8991 
(daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) (statement of Rep. Molinari); id. at S24,799 (daily ed. 
Sept. 20, 1994) (statement of Sen. Dole). Mr. Karp served as Senior Counsel at 
the Office of Policy Development, U.S. Department of Justice.  
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campaign was premised on the notion that rape was common-
place. Many men did it; that was the problem.  
What is surprising about the tough-on-rapists movement is 
not necessarily its success. Much of the push was initiated at 
the federal level, with federal funds attached, at a time when 
both houses of Congress were growing increasingly conserva-
tive and a Democratic president had no desire to appear soft on 
crime, particularly sexual crime.133 What is surprising is how 
little resistance the tough-on-rapists movement encountered 
from feminists. There was minimal public opposition to these 
measures even though just a bit of reflection shows how much 
they reject the feminist insights at the core of the rape reform 
movement.134 It took less than twenty years for most state legis-
latures to, first, override the traditional approach to rape in or-
der to greatly expand the class of offenses that might be crimi-
nalized as sexual assault,135 and then, second, institute unique 
forms of punishment that inevitably restricted the number of 
men whom the criminal justice system would be willing to clas-
sify as rapists. No one commented on the whiplash. 
IV.  AGENCY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW   
The third major impediment for rape reform grew out of 
the delicate relationship between victim injury, victim agency 
and the criminal law. This Part demonstrates how rape’s injury 
is exceedingly difficult to predict, as it more often dependent on 
a victim’s psychological and cultural understanding of sex, than 
on an objective understanding of force or threat. Moreover, 
many victims appear to have both the power and desire to try 
to minimize their injury. Their desire to do this is magnified by 
 
 133. Democratic President Bill Clinton had a notorious reputation as a 
“womanizer,” and was almost impeached for lying about the sexual affair he 
had with a White House intern. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR 
OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT 
CLINTON 1 (1999) (discussing the conduct and subsequent impeachment of 
President Clinton).  
 134. Kristin Bumiller later wrote about the uncomfortable alliance between 
some mainstream feminists and conservative crime-control advocates, see 
KRISTIN BUMILLER, IN AN ABUSIVE STATE: HOW NEOLIBERALISM APPROPRIAT-
ED THE FEMINIST MOVEMENT AGAINST SEXUAL VIOLENCE (2008), but there 
was little public outcry and virtually no mobilization of the political forces that 
pushed the initial rape reforms. For a discussion of the tensions between the 
tough-on-rapists movement and feminism insights, see generally Baker, supra 
note 26, and Wells & Motley, supra note 123. 
 135. See supra text accompanying notes 21–23. 
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a criminal law process that requires them to abdicate their own 
agency and subject themselves to relentless critiques of their 
sexual experience. Finally, the criminal law requires victims to 
label their friends, acquaintances and friends of acquaintances 
as rapists and indict the status quo in which they all live. It 
appears to be much easier for many victims to just not bother.  
A. VICTIM INJURY AND AGENCY 
The history of the law’s treatment of rape, discussed in 
Part I, suggests that there still may not be consensus on how, 
why and when rape victims are injured. In certain situations, 
most obviously in paradigmatic violent stranger rape scenarios, 
everyone agrees that there is victim injury. Professor 
Rubenfeld suggests that injury comes from the invasion of the 
victim’s right to self-possession;136 the liberal view suggests that 
it comes from the interference with the victim’s autonomy be-
cause it involves a nonconsensual touching of a physiologically 
and emotionally meaningful part of the body;137 the Model Pe-
nal Code, though not clear on what the injury from rape is, at 
least makes clear that rape’s injury is unique.138 “Offensive 
Touching” under the Code is treated as its own crime, complete-
ly distinct from battery, which must involve “physical injury.”139 
Other contemporary commentators have argued that the best 
legal framework for conceptualizing rape is larceny; rape is 
kind of theft, though not—as it was for the Romans—from the 
husband or father, but from the woman herself.140   
Because so much of rape’s injury stems from the sexual na-
ture of the act, not the physical harm with which most of the 
 
 136. See supra text accompanying notes 42–47. 
 137. See SCHULHOFER, supra note 20. 
 138. See LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 860. 
 139. See id. (“The modern approach, as reflected in the Model Penal Code, 
is to limit battery to instances of physical injury and cover unwanted sexual 
advances by other statutes.”); ALI Draft, supra note 23 (adopting the approach 
to distinguish sexual offenses from other batteries).  
 140. Richard Posner at one time championed the commodification frame-
work as the best way to think about rape. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS OF LAW 202 (3d ed. 1986); see also Donald A. Dripps, Beyond Rape: 
An Essay on the Difference Between the Presence of Force and the Absence of 
Consent, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1780, 1805 (1992) (suggesting that “we once again 
think about rape as an offense against property”); Yung, supra note 39 (manu-
script at 34) (interpreting and endorsing various other commentators whom he 
says have argued that “rape is essentially the theft of sex”). 
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law of battery is concerned,141 rape’s injury is exceedingly diffi-
cult to measure. This hardly makes it trivial or unworthy of 
criminal protection, but it does mean that rape’s injury is likely 
to be highly subjective. It explains why so little of rape’s injury 
can be predicted by the nature of the act and so much depends 
on the belief structures of the victim and those around her.142 
As Professor Gowri Ramachandran argued in response to Pro-
fessor Rubenfeld, much of rape’s injury is related to the “cul-
tural valence” of sex.143 That cultural valence is necessarily con-
tingent on individual psychological factors and social norms.  
Most feminists writing about the injury of rape have em-
phasized the relationship between rape and fear. Lynne Hen-
derson, bravely describing her own rape, explains that rape in-
volves the “phenomenological harm of thinking you are 
experiencing your own death.”144 Michelle Anderson introduces 
one of her articles with a vivid account of a thirteen-year-old 
girl, frozen with fear, being “non-violently” raped by a sixteen-
year-old neighbor.145 Robin West argues that “[t]he experience 
of rape . . . [involves] fear for one’s own imminent death, and 
the pain of nonconsensual physical touching.”146   
West and Henderson both also suggest that rape’s injury 
involves a kind of psychological harm that is distinct from fear. 
West uses the phrase “spiritual murder.”147 Henderson uses the 
 
 141. See LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 860. 
 142. In rejecting Professor Rubenfeld’s self-possession theory, Professor 
Gowri Ramachandran argues that “Rubenfeld’s self-possession concept ignores 
that sex is particularly meaningful in both good and bad ways, for reasons be-
yond the possession of one partner’s body by the other. The reasons sex is spe-
cial range from its unique long-term physical risks (pregnancy and disease) to 
its cultural valence.” Ramachandran, supra note 46, at 375; see Amy L. Brown 
& Maria Testa, Social Influences on Judgments of Rape Victims: The Role of 
the Negative and Positive Social Reactions of Others, 58 SEX ROLES 490, 496–
97 (2008) (reporting on the variety of factors, including sex-role socialization, 
acceptance of rape myths (in both the victim and the victim’s community), as 
well as the availability of primary and secondary social support networks as 
having a significant effect on victim injury).  
 143. Ramachandran, supra note 46, at 375. 
 144. Lynne N. Henderson, What Makes Rape a Crime?, 3 BERKELEY WOM-
EN’S L.J. 193, 227 (1987).  
 145. Anderson, supra note 31, at 1401–02.  
 146. Robin West, Sex, Law, and Consent, in THE ETHICS OF CONSENT: 
THEORY AND PRACTICE 221, 232 (Franklin G. Miller & Alan Wertheimer eds., 
2010).  
 147. Robin L. West, Legitimating the Illegitimate: A Comment on Beyond 
Rape, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1442, 1447 (1993). 
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phrase “soul murder.”148 Janet Halley understands this depic-
tion of rape’s harm as involving a “breakdown of selfhood.”149  
Social science data confirms that rape can be incredibly in-
jurious psychologically. “[R]ape is one of the most severe of all 
traumas, causing multiple, long-term negative outcomes.”150 Be-
tween 17% and 65% of female rape victims with a lifetime his-
tory of sexual assault develop post-traumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD); between 13% and 51% of rape victims are clinically de-
pressed; between 12% to 40% suffer from anxiety.151 Many rape 
survivors develop dependencies on alcohol or other illicit sub-
stances.152   
The severity of these injuries does not depend on whether 
the perpetrator was a stranger.153 Some studies suggest that 
victims of stranger rapes recover sooner and have lower levels 
of psychological distress than victims of acquaintance rape.154 
Other studies find that stranger rapes and partner rapes (as 
opposed to acquaintance rapes) may produce the most severe 
PTSD,155 while acquaintance rapes produce higher levels of self-
blame.156  
The amount of force used is not necessarily predictive of in-
jury either. Some studies have found a correlation between 
force used in rape and post-assault distress,157 but others have 
not.158 The relationship between violence and trauma may be 
curvilinear, with victims of very high levels and very low levels 
 
 148. Henderson, supra note 144, at 225. 
 149. JANET HALLEY, SPLIT DECISIONS: HOW AND WHY TO TAKE A BREAK 
FROM FEMINISM 63 (2006). 
 150. Rebecca Campbell et al., An Ecological Model of the Impact of Sexual 
Assault on Women’s Mental Health, 10 TRAUMA VIOLENCE & ABUSE 225, 225 
(2009).  
 151. Id. at 225–26 (citing multiple studies). 
 152. Id.  
 153. Id. at 232 (citing studies).  
 154. B. Katz, The Psychological Impact of Stranger vs. Nonstranger Rape 
on Victim’s Recovery, in ACQUAINTANCE RAPE, supra note 27, at 267. 
 155. See Campbell et al., supra note 150, at 232 (citing studies).  
 156. Bonnie L. Katz & Martha R. Burt, Self-Blame in Recovery from Rape, 
in RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT II 151, 162 (Ann Wolbert Burgess ed., 1988).  
 157. Sarah E. Ullman & Judith M. Siegal, Victim-Offender Relationship 
and Sexual Assault, 8 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 121, 129 (1993); I. T. Bownes et 
al., Assault Characteristics and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Rape Vic-
tims, 83 ACTA PSYCHIATRICA SCANDINAVIA 27, 27 (1991).  
 158. See Dean G. Kilpatrick et al., Factors Predicting Psychological Distress 
Among Rape Victims, in TRAUMA AND ITS WAKE 113, 131 (Charles R. Figley, 
ed., 1984); Beverly M. Atkeson et al., Victims of Rape: Repeated Assessment of 
Depressive Symptoms, 50 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 96, 101 (1982).  
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the most traumatized.159 Given these divergent findings, it is 
not particularly surprising that a literature review concludes 
that the “mental health consequences of rape are caused by 
multiple factors beyond characteristics of . . . the assault.”160 In 
other words, there may be no correlation between the kind of 
rape or the perceived culpability of the defendant, and the 
harm inflicted on the victim.161  
One factor that has been found to decrease both the risk of 
injury and the likelihood of rape is resistance. Michelle Ander-
son reports that contrary to what some reformers argued about 
the futility of resistance, resistance is effective in reducing 
rape, while not increasing the chance of injury.162 Passive, non-
resisting victims are especially likely to blame themselves,163 
and self-blame is a significant factor in the extent of a rape vic-
tim’s injury.164 Studies indicate that self-blame decreases the 
rate of a victim’s recovery, increases the chance of PTSD, and 
lessens the likelihood that the victim will report the crime or 
seek help for her injuries.165 One study of the effectiveness of 
rape resistance found that, during the attack, women who 
avoided rape were thinking about avoiding rape, while most 
rape victims were thinking about avoiding death.166   
Professor Anderson does not argue for the reinstatement of 
the resistance requirement, only for the recognition that wom-
 
 159. See Garrison, supra note 61, at 624 (citing studies).  
 160. Campbell et al., supra note 150, at 238.  
 161. The criminal law is accustomed to situations in which the culpability 
of the perpetrator is directly proportional to the harm done the victim.  
 162. Michelle Anderson, Reviving Resistance in Rape Law, 1998 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 983, 985 (1998).  
 163. Id. at 988. 
 164. See Katz & Burt, supra note 156, at 160 (asserting that self-blame is a 
significant component of injury). It is important to note that self-blame is often 
dependent on a host of factors that have absolutely nothing to do with the in-
cident itself. Traditional gender attitudes and rape myth acceptance are 
strongly correlated with how much individuals blame the victim and the more 
others blame the victim, the more likely she is to blame herself. See Brown & 
Testa, supra note 142, at 496.  
 165. Anderson, supra note 162, at 989. 
 166. PAULINE B. BART & PATRICIA H. O’BRIEN, STOPPING RAPE: SUCCESS-
FUL SURVIVAL STRATEGIES 110–11 (1985). This finding begs questions about 
the injury of rape, though it also might reflect the wisdom of victims. Victims 
who believe their lives to be at stake would rather be raped than killed, so 
they do not resist. For further discussion of Professor Henderson’s explanation 
of rape’s injury, see Henderson, supra note 102 (stating that victims fear mur-
der). For other victims who do not sense that their life is at stake, it is worth 
resisting rape. 
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en should—for their own sake—be taught to resist. They are 
less likely to feel injured if they do.167 One way to resist being a 
rape victim—the way Anderson describes—is to fight the man 
off with fists and knees and teeth and screams. Another way is 
to resist the definition of rape. “Research has consistently 
found that a large percentage of women—typically over 50%—
who have experienced vaginal, oral or anal intercourse against 
their will label their experience as something other than 
rape.”168  
Mary Koss interviewed victims of stranger rape: 55% of 
them considered it rape, 15% thought it was a crime different 
than rape and 8% did not believe they were victimized.169 In her 
study of twenty-seven young women who had sexual experience 
that involved force or coercion, Lynn Phillips found that the 
vast majority did not label their experience as abuse or victimi-
zation.170 Regardless of what they were told the legal definition 
of rape is, subject participants let their own understanding of 
rape dictate what they were willing to label as rape.171 When 
asked whether they have ever experienced a given situation, 
and that situation is described with the statutory definitions of 
rape instead of the term “rape” itself, women report a rate of 
victimization that is eleven times greater than when the word 
rape is used.172  
Consider the following quotes, all taken from women de-
scribing what they labeled as a “bad hook-up” experience.  
 
 167. Anderson, supra note 162, at 982.  
 168. Arnold S. Kahn et al., Calling It Rape: Differences in Experiences of 
Women Who Do or Do Not Label Their Sexual Assault as Rape, 27 PSYCHOL. 
WOMEN’S Q. 233, 233 (2003).  
 169. Mary P. Koss et al., Stranger and Acquaintance Rape: Are There Dif-
ferences in the Victim’s Experience, 12 PSYCHOL. WOMEN Q. 1, 6 (1988). 
 170. LYNN M. PHILLIPS, FLIRTING WITH DANGER: YOUNG WOMEN’S RE-
FLECTIONS ON SEXUALITY AND DOMINATION 196 (2000).  
 171. Heather Littleton et al., Risky Situation or Harmless Fun? A Qualita-
tive Examination of College Women’s Bad Hook-up and Rape Scripts, 60 SEX 
ROLES 793, 802 (2009) [hereinafter Risky Situation]; see also Heather Littleton 
et al., Rape Acknowledgement and Post Assault Behaviors: How Acknowledge-
ment Status Relates to Disclosure, Coping, Worldview and Reactions Received 
from Others, 21 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 761, 762 (2006) [hereinafter Rape 
Acknowledgement] (stating students resist adopting a definition of rape that is 
inconsistent with what their “rape script” tells them rape is).  
 172. Leah E. Adams-Curtis & Gordon B. Forbes, College Women’s Experi-
ences of Sexual Coercion: A Review of Cultural, Perpetrator, Victim and Situa-
tional Variables, 5 TRAUMA VIOLENCE & ABUSE 91, 98 (2004). 
256 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [100:221 
 
I was trapped at a party. I wanted to get out of 
there.173 
He just mauled me in my drunken stupor. I 
wanted to cry and throw up. I felt used.174 
He forced sex on me when I was obviously dis-
interested. I just wanted it to be over.175  
He didn’t respect my requests. He used me for 
his own physical pleasure.176 
I wouldn’t say no, but I wouldn’t say yes either. 
So I was passive and he’s kind of a forceful 
guy.177 
[They] took advantage [that] I was wasted. I felt 
horrible and used and experienced pain for 
days.178 
 
One could conclude, as Professor Rubenfeld presumably would, 
that because the men involved in these incidents did not use 
force to get sex, these women were not raped.179 One could con-
clude, using Lynne Henderson’s reflections, that these women 
were not raped because they did not experience the “phenome-
nological harm of thinking [they] were experiencing [their] own 
death.”180 If one uses the affirmative consent standard devel-
oped in some states181 and often adopted by universities for 
their codes of conduct,182 all of these women could be considered 
 
 173. Elizabeth L. Paul & Kristen A. Hayes, The Causalities of Casual Sex: 
A Qualitative Exploration of the Phenomenology of College Students’ Hookups, 
19 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 639, 654 (2002).   
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. at 655. 
 176. Id. at 657–58.  
 177. Laina Y. Bay-Cheng & Rebecca K. Eliseo-Arras, The Making of Un-
wanted Sex: Gendered and Neoliberal Norms in College Women’s Unwanted 
Sexual Experiences, 45 J. SEX RES. 386, 394 (2008).  
 178. See Paul & Hayes, supra note 173. 
 179. Indeed, Professor Rubenfeld would probably argue that the victims in 
the studies understood what “rape” is, while the reformers and legislators who 
changed so many legal definitions did not. See supra text accompanying notes 
42–47. 
 180. Henderson, supra note 144.  
 181. See supra text accompanying notes 34–37. 
 182. Many universities already require an affirmative consent standard. 
See, e.g., Office of the Dean of Students, Sexual Misconduct at the University of 
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victims of rape or sexual assault. If one used the moderate def-
inition of force, like the one used by the judge in John Z.,183 the-
se women would probably also be rape victims.  
Research with college-age populations has found that in in-
cidents like those just described, women: 
did not believe they were personally at risk and they attributed their 
undesired sex not to the man’s pressure or force but to their own lack 
of ability to think clearly or resist. . . . These women seem to have 
presumed that men are going to have sex with a woman unless the 
woman forcefully resists, and her inability to resist meant to [them] 
that what happened was not rape.184 
Comparably, Professors Laina Bay-Cheng and Rebecca 
Eliseo-Arras have argued that the “neoliberal” rhetoric of “self-
determination and personal responsibility . . . lead[s] women to 
blame themselves for unwanted sex.”185  
Professor Michelle Oberman and I have recently argued 
that women help protect themselves against rape’s injury by 
constructing away the crime.186 Raised to believe they have 
sexual agency even if research continues to confirm that they 
do not usually exercise it, young women today would rather see 
their failure to resist as an affirmative act that resulted in un-
wanted sex, than see his failure to stop as the affirmative act 
that resulted in rape. Women’s understanding of their own 
agency may help diminish any injury: “Perhaps the spirit is not 
murdered if women interpret their decision not to fight back, to 
get it over with, to let it happen, as a kind of control that keeps 
their souls intact.”187   
Given that rape’s injury is so dependent on the psychologi-
cal and cultural construction of sex, there are powerful reasons 
to resist thinking of oneself as having been raped. People “re-
gard[] rape as a potentially life-altering experience that has a 
 
Oregon, UNIV. OF OR. (2013), https://uodos.uoregon.edu/StudentConductand 
CommunityStandards/SexualMisconduct.aspx; Student Manual: University 
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 183. See Oberman, supra note 90, at 387. 
 184. Arnold S. Kahn et al., Calling It Rape, 27 PSYCHOL. WOMEN’S Q. 233, 
240 (2003). 
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 186. See generally Baker & Oberman, supra note 32 (examining sexual 
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persistent and perhaps life-long negative impact.”188 Professor 
Anderson quotes one resister, who was physically injured while 
she resisted, but who avoided being raped: “[T]hank goodness 
he broke my jaw instead of raping me. I like my sex life. I didn’t 
want my sex life screwed up. A broken jaw is easy to deal 
with.”189  
Can one help oneself avoid a “screwed up” sex life and “life-
long negative impacts” by interpreting a past event as within 
one’s control even if one did not feel in control at the time?190 If 
one has not been raped, one does not necessarily have to blame 
oneself for letting the rape happen. One might blame oneself 
for getting too drunk, or having sex one didn’t want, but the ex-
tent and severity of the blame are likely different—precisely 
because rape is socially understood as more traumatic than 
that. If one can avoid life-altering injury by interpreting away 
the crime, isn’t that a particularly effective form of resistance?  
Recall the rape reform movement’s desire to give women 
voice, to respect women’s decision-making capacity and prevent 
the law from assuming her consent. In order to do that, rape 
laws were re-written to allow for rape convictions even if wom-
en did not exercise agency or make a clear decision. The laws 
were designed to incorporate the reality of women’s passivity, 
but many contemporary women reject that depiction of them-
selves. Whether they act passively or not, they do not want to 
see themselves or have others see them as passive.  
The irony here is striking. Potential rape victims are—in 
fact if not in law—resurrecting the resistance requirement, the 
one traditional element of the crime that no one defends on 
theoretical grounds. In their own minds, they were not raped 
because they had the ability to resist and chose not exercise it. 
In cases where one is not phenomenologically experiencing 
one’s own murder, believing in one’s own agency may be the 
best resistance strategy there is.  
 
 188. Risky Situation, supra note 171, at 801.  
 189. Anderson, supra note 162, at 984. Rape victims are more likely than 
the rest of the population to experience fear of sex and arousal dysfunction. 
See Patricia A. Resick, The Psychological Impact of Rape, 8 J. INTERPERSONAL 
VIOLENCE 223, 232–33 (1993). These studies assume that someone identifies 
as a rape victim.  
 190. At least one study has found that victims’ conceptualization of the as-
sault can be influenced by experiences after the assault. See Rape Acknowl-
edgment, supra note 171, at 774. 
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This re-envisioning of the event may not work in the long 
term. Given the psychological nature of rape’s injury, even 
women who attempt to construct away their injury may still 
have life-altering consequences. At least one study concluded 
that “[b]oth unacknowledged and acknowledged victims [of 
forced, unwanted or incapacitated sex] reported elevated psy-
chological distress, damage to their worldview, and engaging in 
extensive coping efforts.”191 These injuries often manifest them-
selves later, after memories have faded and many people have 
moved on. The idea of pursuing the assailant after so much 
time has passed is even more difficult than pursuing him di-
rectly after the assault.  
B. VICTIM AGENCY AND THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 
Even for women who do not try to re-envision the event so 
as to give themselves more agency, the importance of reclaim-
ing their sense of agency can explain why they do not turn to 
the criminal law for prosecution. By invoking the criminal re-
gime designed to protect them, rape victims can make their in-
jury worse.  
A woman who reports as a rape victim is usually taken 
first to medical authorities who scrutinize her story for possible 
medical implications. Then she is confronted by police who 
must scrutinize her story to determine whether they should 
proceed. If she is convincing enough for the police, she is taken 
to the prosecutor, who—as the General Sinclair saga undoubt-
edly shows—must scrutinize her story to determine whether it 
is an appropriate one for prosecution. And, if it is an appropri-
ate one for prosecution, she must be prepared to tell her story, 
again and again and again, publicly. She must arm herself 
against an onslaught of (perfectly appropriate) attacks on her 
credibility by the defense team, and ultimately surrender the 
decisions about how her story gets told to the prosecuting at-
torneys, who take command of the case. It is hard to imagine a 
process more potentially damaging to one’s agency. 
Women who choose not to press charges may realize how 
injurious the process itself is likely to be and allow that to 
guide their decision. Studies confirm that women who pursue 
criminal prosecution suffer from more self-doubt and self-blame 
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than those who do not.192 And it is self-doubt and self-blame 
that are associated with greater PTSD. Winning at trial does 
not necessarily alleviate the injury. The victim in John Z. was 
devastated by the trial,193 and the victim in the Steubenville 
case was ostracized.194   
In sum, there are a multitude of reasons why victims may 
be resistant to acknowledging they were raped and/or using the 
criminal process designed to redress their injury. If one sees 
oneself as a victim, one acknowledges a powerlessness and a 
lack of control. One has failed to be the agent one wants to be. 
If one experiences the act as traumatic, regardless of how em-
powered one felt during it, the healthiest response may be to 
block out the specifics of the crime.195 This makes many victims 
bad witnesses. To become a better witness, indeed, to make it 
at all possible for the criminal justice system to vindicate their 
injuries, they must re-live the traumatic incident, over and over 
again, and have their interpretation of the events subject to 
constant scrutiny by allies, foes and theoretically neutral 
strangers.  
Feminist and other critics of the law’s treatment of rape 
have maintained for years that entrenched misogyny and pa-
triarchy lead to police unfounding196 cases, prosecutors refusing 
to prosecute cases and defense counsel being given liberty to 
torment victims on the stand.197 That critique may have merit, 
but even if reformers were able to dislodge all that misogyny 
and patriarchy, the context in which most acquaintance rape 
happens, the means of establishing facts at trial, and the pro-
tections that our system must afford criminal defendants inevi-
tably result in a process for rape enforcement that is likely to 
 
 192. See Patricia Yancey Martin & R. Marlene Powell, Accounting for the 
“Second Assault”: Legal Organizations’ Framing of Rape Victims, 19 L. & SOC. 
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 197. See supra note 98.  
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exacerbate the unique psychological injuries that rape victims 
suffer.198   
C. VICTIM INJURY AND BLAME 
It is not only themselves that rape victims want to protect 
when they resist the label rape. Victims are often uncomforta-
ble labeling the men who were negligent, recklessly indifferent 
with regard to consent, or even a bit forceful, as rapists. Over 
the last twenty years there has been extensive academic theo-
rizing on the appropriate mens rea for rape,199 but the only de-
cision maker that really matters in this inquiry is the victim. If 
she does not see the man as culpable, she will not label what 
happened to her as rape. Consider the comments of one college 
student: “there were reasons these guys were led to believe I 
would do those things.”200 Of course there were reasons that 
“those guys” thought they could do what they did. Everyone 
was following the sexual scripts that rape reform tried to re-
write. Everyone had learned that her not saying no was per-
mission for him to go forward. The law can try to revoke that 
permission, but if individuals still internalize the script, vic-
tims are not going to feel comfortable charging “those guys” 
with rape.  
The tough-on-rapists movement described in Part III 
makes the idea of labeling such incidents as rape all the more 
difficult. What does it say about the women who might report 
rape if by doing so they are saying that they, and probably their 
friends, enjoyed socializing with, and often having consensual 
sex with, the kind of deviant psychopaths whom we single out 
for stigmatizing treatment because they are rapists? 
Champions of the force requirement might use women’s re-
luctance to blame men as proof that rape requires force. As a 
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 200. Bay-Cheng & Eliseo-Arras, supra note 177 (describing perceived rea-
sons for unwanted sexual experiences). 
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theoretical matter, that reasoning is tautological; but as a prac-
tical matter, it is irrefutable. Women’s reluctance to blame men 
for rape comes from the lingering cultural confusion over what 
rape is. If everyone came to view the traditional sexual scripts 
as pernicious and outdated, like the rule of thumb for domestic 
violence,201 it would be much easier to blame men for proceeding 
without consent. If people thought about consenting to sex the 
way we think about consenting to a medical procedure, that is, 
if people recognized that the decision of whether to go forward 
is firmly vested in the person to be touched and invaded, not in 
the doctor who may really want to operate, then the women 
who currently resist blaming men would likely be much more 
willing to do so. If rape reform had succeeded in dismantling 
the old scripts, victims would likely see what “those guys” did 
as “bad enough” to be willing to blame them.202   
As a practical matter, however, the power to expand the 
scope of behavior that can be defined as rape is inevitably in 
the hands of victims. If they believe in male entitlement, they 
will not be willing to punish the men who are just pursuing 
that to which they are entitled. As one of Elizabeth Paul’s col-
lege subjects said, perhaps not even realizing the power that 
she had to make law and social meaning, “[w]hen you blame it 
on the other person, it sounds rapish.”203 And if you choose not 
blame it on someone else, it will not be rape.  
V.  THE PROMISE OF TITLE IX   
A. ANOTHER CRIMINAL ATTEMPT  
The draft changes to the Model Penal Code, circulated by 
the American Law Institute last year, attempt to deal with the 
failure of rape reform to change the norm of male entitlement 
to sex by proposing not only more gradations in kinds of felony 
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sexual assault crimes, but also a new misdemeanor, § 213.4, 
called “Sexual Intercourse without Consent.”204 Section 213.4 is 
an “embrace of an affirmative-consent requirement.”205 It makes 
clear that no one should feel entitled to sex unless one’s partner 
gives clear indications of consent. According to the drafters, by 
making a misdemeanor of going forward in the absence of con-
sent, § 213.4 reflects “the increasing recognition that sexual as-
sault is an offense against the core value of individual autono-
my, the individual’s right to control the boundaries of his or her 
sexual experience, rather than a mere exercise of physical dom-
inance.”206 By lessening the severity of the crime, from a felony 
to a misdemeanor, the drafters also probably hoped to make it 
easier for women to come forward to blame perpetrators.  
While § 213.4 is certainly well-meaning, this Article—
particularly when filtered through the politics of modern crimi-
nal law enforcement—suggests that the adoption of this new 
misdemeanor will do little to change the norm of male entitle-
ment to sex. There may be convictions under § 213.4, but they 
will likely be plea deals or trial verdicts that represent a com-
promise in a case that was really about force. No one will see 
what change is arguably necessary before the norm of male en-
titlement to sex can change: the law punishing nonconsensual 
sex qua nonconsensual sex.  
Prosecutors do not like to lose. Their professional future, 
and an efficient allocation of their department’s resources, de-
pend on them accumulating convictions at trial.207 Money spent 
on a lost trial is wasted money. Thus, prosecutors will often 
take a plea to a misdemeanor over a chance of an acquittal at 
trial. Imagine again the General Sinclair case, but with no lies 
about a cell phone and with an allegation of more force—
perhaps he really did pin her arms against her back or choke 
her as he forced her mouth to his penis. As discussed in Part II, 
even this “better” case will be exceedingly difficult to prove. It 
simply would not be that hard for a defense team to sow the 
seeds of reasonable doubt. In any standard prosecution, i.e., not 
one being scrutinized by the national media because the mili-
 
 204. See ALI Draft, supra note 23, § 213.4, at 67. 
 205. See id. § 213.4 cmt., at 68. 
 206. Id.  
 207. “Defeats at trial are costly for prosecutors, both because trials are 
costly and because defeats are salient—they are relatively rare . . . and hence 
vivid, both to prosecutors and to the public.” Stuntz, supra note 103.  
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tary has gotten into so much trouble for not taking rape seri-
ously,208 the prosecution will know just how easily the defense 
can create doubt and escape prosecution. They will take a plea 
to the misdemeanor. And without a realistic possibility of a 
conviction based on force, defendants will have little reason to 
even plead to the misdemeanor.  
Unlike the standard legislative expansion of criminal law, 
which involves the enactment of a new law that is easier to 
prove than the real crime it is targeting,209 the addition of  
§ 213.4 will not create an offense that is any easier for the 
prosecution to prove. Therefore it is very unlikely that prosecu-
tors will bring cases under § 213.4 alone. Consider the late Pro-
fessor William Stuntz’s example of the relationship between the 
crime of burglary and the crime of possessing burglar’s tools.210 
Stuntz suggested that legislators enacted the second, lesser 
crime to allow for prosecutions when it was too hard to estab-
lish guilt for the target crime of burglary (because proving bur-
glary requires proving intent to commit burglary, which is diffi-
cult). More uniformly, Stuntz argued that when the elements of 
a target crime are ABC, legislators often enact a new crime, 
AB, which lets prosecutors choose whether to prosecute based 
on their sense of C, regardless of whether they can prove C.211 
Hence, in reality, prosecutors are only likely to prosecute for 
possession of burglar’s tools when they think that the defend-
ant actually did intend to commit burglary.  
The relationship between § 213.4 and the felony sexual as-
sault provisions will not operate in the same way. It will be no 
easier to prove sex without consent than it is to prove sex with 
force. Indeed, it may be more difficult. The traditional defini-
tion of rape required “(A) carnal knowledge of a woman, . . . (B) 
through force, and (C) against her will.”212 The most serious 
sexual assault offenses still usually require (A) “an act of sexu-
al intercourse (B), secured through “physical force . . . or . . . 
threat of physical force.”213 Section 213.4 suggests that B is not 
 
 208. See Blinder & Oppel, supra note 70.  
 209. See Stuntz, supra note 103, at 537. 
 210. See id. at 538. 
 211. Id. at 519. 
 212. See LAFAVE, supra note 17, at 891. 
 213. See, e.g., ALI Draft supra note 23, § 213.1, at 1. 
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always necessary. Thus there is a crime in AC, not only in ABC 
or AB.214  
Section 213.4 embodies the rape reformer ideal, but elimi-
nating B does not make the prosecutors’ proof any easier. Prov-
ing B (force) has always established C (lack of consent), but 
proving C on its own, as discussed above, is incredibly difficult. 
It is not at all akin to proving the possession of burglar’s tools. 
There is little reason to presume that prosecutors will believe 
they can win a conviction for AC any more easily than they 
could win a conviction for AB or ABC.  
Thus, there is little reason to believe that prosecutors will 
ever bother to try a § 213.4 case on its own, without some sort 
of threat of a more serious conviction as well. AC cases will be 
too hard to win and the payoff, because it is only a misdemean-
or, will be small. No prosecutor will bother. This means that 
notwithstanding the potential symbolic effect of criminalizing 
sex without consent,215 no one will see the criminal law punish-
ing sex without consent, because prosecutors will not prosecute 
the crime. The criminal law will not be effective in shifting the 
norm of male entitlement to sex.  
B. THE CIVIL LAW DIFFERENCE 
The Department of Education’s (DOE) recent campaign to 
recast sexual assault as a problem of sex discrimination, not 
necessarily a problem of criminal law enforcement, minimizes 
most of the impediments to rape reform identified above. Eve-
ryone’s perspective and incentives can change once sexual as-
sault is seen as a campus-wide behavioral problem, the respon-
sibility for which resides with the university. For it to work, 
though, everyone must understand that the campus process is 
not necessarily convicting “rapists.” Campus tribunals should 
not present themselves as criminal courts, and they should 
 
 214. Reformers also argued that rape could involve many forms of noncon-
sensual sexual activity in addition to “carnal knowledge.” See supra text ac-
companying note 24.  
 215. Oberman and I have endorsed keeping the “baseline of no” laws even 
if they are primarily symbolic because that symbolism sends an important 
message about the importance of mutuality in sex. See Baker & Oberman, su-
pra note 32. Stuntz notes that the symbolic effect of a norm-pushing law that 
is not prosecuted may cut in opposite directions. On the one hand, establishing 
a crime of nonconsensual sex may send an important message about what the 
state views as wrong. On the other hand, seeing the state never enforce that 
crime “might send precisely the opposite message.” Stuntz, supra note 103, at 
521. 
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fight any outside attempts to construe them as such. As Cath-
arine MacKinnon understood twenty-five years ago, when so 
many women feel violated by behavior that conforms to estab-
lished norms, the problem is that women are raped, “but not by 
[] rapist[s].”216 University procedures must focus more on help-
ing the women who are hurt than on punishing the men as rap-
ists.  
1. The Problems Avoided 
a. Underenforcement 
With a civil, intra-university regime, there will not be the 
same disincentive problems, just discussed, with bringing sex-
ual assault cases at the margins that involve non-consent with-
out force. Unlike criminal prosecutors who have to worry about 
their own careers if they prosecute a hard-to-win case that re-
sults in an acquittal, the DOE has made clear that universities 
have to worry about the opposite problem. “Regardless of 
whether a harassed student . . . files a complaint under the 
school’s grievance procedures . . . a school that knows, or rea-
sonably should know, about possible harassment must prompt-
ly investigate to determine what occurred and then take appro-
priate steps to resolve the situation.”217 Unlike prosecutors, 
whose decisions not to prosecute routinely escape any kind of 
scrutiny,218 the DOE articulates a plan to scrutinize all deci-
sions not to prosecute.219 Indeed, a decision not to prosecute is 
likely to be subject to more vigorous questioning than an inves-
tigation that ended in acquittal, because at least the latter re-
sult suggests that the university is taking the potentially dis-
criminatory situation seriously. Moreover, universities have 
very broad discretion to craft behavioral standards as they 
choose; thus they can prohibit behavior that the state, through 
the criminal law, could not prohibit.220  
 
 216. See MACKINNON, supra note 117.  
 217. U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, DEAR COLLEAGUE LET-
TER: SEXUAL VIOLENCE BACKGROUND, SUMMARY AND FAST FACTS 4 (2011) 
[hereinafter DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER]. 
 218. See Stuntz, supra note 103, at 547–48 (noting prosecutors’ freedom not 
to prosecute and the likelihood that they won’t prosecute a sympathetic de-
fendant).  
 219. See DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 217, at 19. 
 220. See Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 244 (D. Vt. 
1994) (noting that the university could punish an offense of “disrespect for 
persons” even if it did not believe the student was guilty of rape); Holert v. 
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b. Burden of Proof  
The DOE has made the determination that universities 
must use a preponderance of the evidence standard, not the 
criminal standard or even a clear and convincing evidence 
standard, in adjudicating matters of sexual assault and coer-
cion.221 An environment in which men feel free to remain indif-
ferent to women’s feelings and desires is an environment in 
which women are not likely to feel that they are being treated 
with the equal respect and dignity that Title IX requires.222 
Women are entitled to redress if they can prove that men’s en-
titlement to nonconsensual sex has an injurious and discrimi-
natory effect on their learning environment. Women do not 
have to show bodily injury or psychological trauma in order to 
make a compelling claim that the way men are treating them is 
demeaning and having a detrimental effect on their educational 
environment. Women can prove that by showing, by a prepon-
derance of the evidence, that men continue to disregard their 
consent when engaging in sex.  
What women are not necessarily entitled to under Title IX 
is the imposition of any kind of criminal conviction or criminal 
sanction on the perpetrator. But universities need not—and in-
deed should not—conflate their internal disciplinary proce-
dures with criminal proceedings. Precisely because discrimina-
 
Univ. of Chi., 751 F. Supp. 1294, 1301 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (explaining that though 
cleared of criminal harassment charges, complainant could still be expelled 
from the university for harassing behavior in violation of the university’s own 
standards); Paul E. Rosenthal, Speak Now: The Accused Student’s Right To 
Remain Silent in Public University Disciplinary Proceedings, 97 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1241, 1245–46 (1997) (noting universities have discretion to institute 
their own moral and ethical requirements for conduct).  
 221. In its Dear Colleague Letter, issued on April 4, 2011, the Department 
of Education explained that it believes that discrimination doctrine requires 
that schools use a preponderance of the evidence standard, not beyond a rea-
sonable doubt or a clear and convincing evidence standard for establishing 
sexual harassment or violence. DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 217, at 
10–11. A higher standard of proof would likely result in discrimination be-
cause women who were assaulted, but could only establish it with 55% or 65% 
certainty, for instance, would not be able to secure any redress. See id. 
 222. See U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, REVISED SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, 
OTHER STUDENTS OR THIRD PARTIES ii (2001) http://www2.ed.gov/about/  
offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf, (detailing the compliance standards the DOE 
uses to enforce Title IX and explaining that Title IX prohibits harassing con-
duct that “interfere[s] with a student’s academic performance and emotional 
and physical well-being,” and that “[p]reventing and remedying sexual har-
assment in schools is essential to ensuring a safe environment in which stu-
dents can learn”). 
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tion requires a lesser standard of proof, it would be unfair to 
the accused to have a university disciplinary action be treated 
as a determination of criminality. It is not. It is a finding of dis-
criminatory treatment that should not bring with it the moral 
condemnation that criminal sanctions engender.  
c. Criminal Stigma and Due Process 
The difference in consequence between being found respon-
sible for civil discrimination, or possibly a university-created 
offense like “disrespect of persons,”223 and being found criminal-
ly responsible for rape or sexual assault provides the third rea-
son why the DOE solution is likely to be more effective than 
criminal rape reform. By identifying the men who treated them 
badly, women will not necessarily be suggesting that these men 
are pathological or even criminal. It is important that universi-
ties not treat the men that way.  
Initial reports indicate that many universities have failed 
to grasp their opportunity and responsibility to treat sexually 
predatory behavior as something other than an incident of pro-
found moral turpitude. Stories abound of universities running 
what seem to be kangaroo courts, affording men little process 
and expelling them after cursory fact-finding.224 All the DOE’s 
guidance requires, however, is a “prompt and equitable resolu-
tion”225 of a sexual assault matter. The university must take 
“prompt and effective steps to respond to sexual harassment or 
violence,”226 but the guidance leaves it up to the university to 
determine what those steps should be.  
Public universities must provide due process,227 and many 
commentators have argued that private universities owe any 
accused student a comparably protective amount of process.228 
 
 223. See Fellheimer, 869 F. Supp. at 244.  
 224. See Judith Grossman, Opinion, A Mother, a Feminist, Aghast, WALL 
ST. J., Apr. 17, 2013, at A15; James Taranto, Opinion, An Education in College 
Justice, WALL ST. J., Dec. 7–8, 2013, at A13; John Laureman, College Men Ac-
cused of Sexual Assault Say Their Rights Are Violated, BLOOMBERG NEWS 
(Dec. 16, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-12-16/college 
-men-accused-of-sexual-assault-say-their-rights-violated (all reporting cases of 
colleges affording defendants minimal protection and often expelling him). 
 225. DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 217, at 8. 
 226. Id. at 16. 
 227. Id. at 12. 
 228. See Thomas R. Baker, Cross-Examination of Witnesses in College Stu-
dent Disciplinary Hearings: A New York Case Rekindles an Old Controversy, 
142 EDUC. L. REP. 11, 12–14 (arguing that due process, particularly the right 
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That process probably requires a hearing, a right to counsel, 
and notice, but these protections are not that difficult or costly 
to provide.229  
The most problematic procedural protection in sexual mis-
conduct hearings is the right to confront the witness. As Parts 
II and IV detail, the process of preparing a witness for confron-
tation and the right of defendant’s counsel to scrutinize the 
witness’ credibility are often brutal on those victims who dare 
to press charges. On the other hand, the need to confront wit-
nesses is strongest when credibility is crucial. If, as some critics 
seem to suggest,230 it is essential that an accused student be 
given the opportunity to confront his accuser in the manner af-
forded to him by the criminal law, then the process will inevi-
tably chill victims’ willingness to come forward.231  
There is no easy answer here. The right to confrontation 
may be critical for men who have been falsely accused, but it is 
demonstrably harmful to women who have been victimized.232 If 
universities provide full criminal rights to alleged abusers 
there will be underenforcement of the university rules proscrib-
ing predatory behavior, and there will very likely be more of 
 
to cross-examine, is crucial in disciplinary hearings); Curtis J. Berger & Vivi-
an Berger, Academic Discipline: A Guide to Fair Process for the University 
Student, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 289, 331–37 (1999) (arguing that universities 
have a duty of good faith and fair dealing under contract law); Lisa 
Tenerowicz, Student Misconduct at Private Colleges and Universities: A 
Roadmap for “Fundamental Fairness” in Disciplinary Proceedings, 42 B.C. L. 
REV. 653, 687–92 (2001) (stating that the following ought to be present in stu-
dent disciplinary proceedings: written notice of the charges, presumption of 
innocence, impartial hearing, right to confront witnesses, and the right to 
counsel).  
 229. Because a finding of sexual misconduct could result in suspension or 
expulsion, and because these cases usually involve contested fact, “some kind 
of hearing” is almost certainly necessary. Bd. of Curators of the Univ. of Mo. v. 
Horowitz, 35 U.S. 78, 95 n.5 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (“A decision relat-
ing to the misconduct of a student requires a factual determination as to 
whether the conduct took place or not. The accuracy of that determination can 
be safeguarded by the sorts of procedural protections traditionally imposed 
under the Due Process Clause.”); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 579 (1975) (stat-
ing that serious disciplinary consequences demand a hearing). To date, many 
universities seem to have resisted providing notice and opportunities for coun-
sel, but it is not clear why they have been so resistant to these basic protec-
tions. See Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 244 (D. Vt. 1994) 
(stating that a university must provide notice of charges against a defendant); 
Grossman, supra note 224 (alleging that her son’s college disciplinary hearing 
would not allow him representation). 
 230. See supra notes 6–8.  
 231. See supra Part IV.B. 
 232. See Martin & Powell, supra note 192. 
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that behavior. The more robust the right to confrontation be-
comes, the less likely victims will be to come forward. Reasona-
ble minds may differ on whether university cultures would ra-
ther accept an inevitable amount of predatory behavior,233 or an 
adjudicatory system that potentially punishes people who have 
not violated university rules. But that is the choice. It is folly to 
suggest that a school can provide full criminal safeguards and 
punish all or even most sexual assaults. For all of the reasons 
elucidated above, the criminal process simply does not work 
that well for these kinds of sexual encounters.  
There may be acceptable alternatives to the traditional 
right to confrontation. Courts have allowed victims to testify 
out of sight of the accused, which may help diminish the trau-
ma.234 One commentator has suggested using audiotape;235 an-
other has suggested allowing the defendant to present ques-
tions to the hearing board, which could then ask them of the 
witness.236 Providing these procedures may be able to immunize 
a university from a due process challenge, even if the universi-
ty uses the preponderance standard to determine whether the 
prohibited conduct occurred.  
The best and most effective way of ensuring an adequate 
amount of protective process for the accused, however, is to 
simply reduce the severity of the penalty. The Supreme Court 
has made clear on numerous occasions that procedural due pro-
cess is a flexible doctrine and that the amount of process due 
depends on the scope and nature of the liberty interest in jeop-
ardy.237 Understandably, because rape has been a crime for so 
 
 233. General Patton assumed as much of soldiers. “[I]n spite of [his] most 
diligent efforts, there would unquestionably be some raping” by his men. 
BROWNMILLER, supra note 15, at 73.  
 234. See Cloud v. Trs. of Bos. Univ., 720 F.2d 721, 725 (1st Cir. 1983) (stat-
ing that procedure was adequately protective of defendant’s rights even 
though witness was allowed to testify out of defendant’s sight). 
 235. Baker, supra note 228, at 25. 
 236. Tenerowicz, supra note 228, at 691. 
 237. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (holding that a biological 
father who has not developed a relationship with his child is not due very 
much process before his rights are terminated because his failure to develop a 
relationship minimizes the importance of his liberty interest in an on-going 
relationship with his child); Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Re-
form, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (discussing process due to foster parents before the 
state removes a foster child and concluding that very little process is due be-
cause the risk of erroneous deprivation of the child being returned to his or her 
natural parents is so small); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) 
(laying out balancing test that weighs the importance of the personal interest 
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long238 and because so many people continue to view rapists as 
distinctly evil,239 universities have tended to expel or at least 
suspend anyone found responsible for any form of sexual as-
sault, or even “disrespect of persons,” if that disrespect involved 
sexual contact.240 But universities do not have to do so. In many 
instances, particularly if the tribunal feels that situational fac-
tors (everyone was drunk, many other men were behaving the 
same way, the verbal and non-verbal signals with regard to 
consent were ambiguous for quite a while), it may be appropri-
ate to render a relatively modest punishment, like a notation 
on a college record and protection for the complainant. 
DOE’s guidance requires that the complainant be protected 
from having to encounter or worry about regularly encounter-
ing the perpetrator.241 This seems to suggest that DOE thinks 
that perpetrators will not necessarily be suspended or expelled. 
The less severe the punishment, the less the need for extensive, 
confrontational process that runs the risk of deterring too many 
women from coming forward.  
Doing something small to an individual is not the same as 
doing nothing at all, but many schools seem caught in an all or 
nothing binary. In one incident made public by an alleged vic-
tim, Harvard University refused to ask an alleged perpetrator 
to move dormitories, despite evidence that the alleged victim 
was suffering severely from the perpetrator’s co-residence in 
her dorm.242 The behavior in question skirted the line of what 
the university officially prohibited.243 The University apparent-
 
at stake in light of the risk of erroneous deprivation of that interest, the value 
of additional safeguards and the state’s interest in providing alternative or 
lesser process). 
 238. See supra Part I.A. 
 239. See supra Part III. 
 240. See Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 244 (D. Vt. 
1994) (finding that a university expelled a student for “disrespect of persons,” 
even though a tribunal could not find that he had committed rape).  
 241. See DEAR COLLEAGUE LETTER, supra note 217, at 16–17 (suggesting 
that escort services be provided to the complainant and that class schedules 
and dorm assignments be coordinated so that the two students do not come 
into regular contact with each other).  
 242. Dear Harvard: You Win, THE HARVARD CRIMSON (Mar. 31, 2014), 
http://www.thecrimson.com/article/2014/3/31/Harvard-sexual-assault. 
 243. This is the victim’s account of what happened:  
He was a friend of mine and I trusted him. It was a freezing Friday 
night when I stumbled into his dorm room after too many drinks. He 
took my shirt off and started biting the skin on my neck and breast. I 
pushed back on his chest and asked him to stop kissing me aggres-
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ly therefore felt powerless to ask the young man to re-locate, or 
to reprimand him for behavior that while not a clear violation 
of university sexual assault policy, would nonetheless seem to 
be an obvious violation of appropriate student conduct norms.244  
Perhaps the administrators simply did not believe the al-
leged victim. If they thought she was making it up, or misre-
membering too much of it, then doing nothing is appropriate. 
But if they believed her and still did nothing to reprimand ob-
viously odious conduct that clearly had an on-going detrimental 
effect on the victim, then Harvard rendered itself paralyzed for 
no good reason. The idea that forcing a college student at one of 
the most elite universities in the world to move dormitories is 
somehow a kind of punishment that requires full criminal pro-
cess is absurd. The accused would still be free to graduate, in 
his chosen major, with his social networks intact.  
In those instances in which it seems appropriate to render 
a small individual punishment, it may also be appropriate to 
institute a broader, community-wide measure aimed at chang-
ing norms. If everyone at the party was doing it, or everyone at 
the school regularly does it, it may be especially unjust to sin-
gle one man out for punishment, but particularly appropriate to 
require much more comprehensive training and education for 
the community at large. When it is clear that community norms 
(which the university has the authority to set and enforce)245 
were violated, even if it is unclear who violated them, dorm-
wide or fraternity-wide or household-wide punishments could 
be imposed. For years, universities have used honor codes to 
collectivize responsibility for individual transgressions.246 Sure-
 
sively. He laughed. He said that I should “just wear a scarf” to cover 
the marks. He continued to abuse my body, hurting my breast and 
vagina. He asked me to use my mouth. I said no. I was intoxicated, I 
was in pain, I was trapped between him and the wall, and I was 
scared to death that he would continue to ignore what I said. I 
stopped everything and turned my back to him, praying he would 
leave me alone. He started getting impatient. “Are you only going to 
make me hard, or are you going to make me come?” he said in a de-
manding tone. It did not sound like a question. I obeyed. 
Id. 
 244. Students need some notice of what code of conduct standards are, but 
it is hard to believe that this man could maintain that he thought his behavior 
was consistent with a basic requirement of respect for other students. He was 
probably entitled to be confused about whether his behavior constituted sexual 
assault, but not about whether his behavior was appropriate.  
 245. See supra note 220 and accompanying text. 
 246. See Eric Roberts, Honor Codes Across the Country, STANFORD UNIV. 
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ly, if a school can impose punishment on student A because 
student A knew or should have known student B cheated and 
did not report it, then a school can impose punishment on stu-
dent A because he knew or should have known that student B 
was taking advantage of a fellow member of the community 
who was too scared or too drunk to protect herself.  
Thirty-five years ago, before Catharine MacKinnon pub-
lished Sexual Harassment of Working Women,247 most everyone 
accepted the inevitability of boys being boys and the workplace 
being inundated with lewd, obnoxious and pestering sexual be-
havior perpetrated by men toward women. Within twenty years 
those norms had changed radically and most everyone knew 
that previously commonplace behavior was inappropriate and 
unfair to women.248 The norms of workplace behavior did not 
change because everyone read MacKinnon’s book nor because 
the perpetrators of the lewd, obnoxious behavior were thrown 
in jail. The norms changed, in large part, because businesses 
were found vicariously liable for the behavior of their employ-
ees.249 Sexual harassment training is now a part of almost every 
workplace. If universities understood the problem of sexual as-
sault the way employers understand the problem of sexual har-
assment, that is, as an environmental problem, likely created 
and fostered elsewhere, but which nonetheless has become uni-
versities’ responsibility, universities could likely do much to 
change the current culture that results in twenty percent of col-
lege women being assaulted.  
d. The Agency Dilemma 
There is still the issue of whether victims will be as re-
sistant to labeling themselves as victims of discrimination as 
they are to labeling themselves as victims of sexual assault. 
Coming forward as a victim of discrimination may allow a vic-
 
http://cs.stanford.edu/people/eroberts/cs181/projects/honor-code/honorcodes 
.html (last visited Aug. 31, 2015) (explaining standard honor code procedures 
and linking to other schools that have them).  
 247. CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING 
WOMEN: A CASE OF SEX DISCRIMINATION (1979).  
 248. See Kahan, supra note 78, at 635 (citations omitted). 
 249. See Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 798–810 (1998) 
(holding that an employer is held vicariously liable for discriminatory conduct 
by a supervisor); Burlington Indus., Inc. v Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754–66 (1998) 
(affirming that firms can be vicariously liable if they do not take affirmative 
steps to prevent harassment).  
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tim to identify as someone who is helping future women who 
would be hurt by the same institutional forces, as opposed to 
someone who blames a man because she was too weak to help 
herself. Women still may not come forward, though. As Kristin 
Bumiller revealed in her study of race and sex discrimination, 
victims often distrust the legal process, resent the need for it, 
and remain skeptical of how much good it can do. So they often 
do not pursue legal remedies, even if they feel entitled to 
them.250  
Bumiller’s work suggests that victims of discrimination 
have complicated and mixed feelings about their victimization. 
Victims on college campuses may feel the same way, but uni-
versity disciplinary procedures offer a potentially more hospi-
table and nurturing process for victims than does the civil law. 
Moreover, because universities are more closed, paternalistic 
environments, they may be able to protect victims who do come 
forward from being ostracized.251 At present, there is also a 
groundswell of grassroots support for organizing potential vic-
tims on college campuses to push for change.252 There is a pow-
erful institutional actor, DOE, validating the idea of their inju-
ry and supporting any attempts to come forward. Even women 
who defend current sexual norms on college campuses because 
they see them as better than the more restrictive sexual norms 
that came before acknowledge that contemporary campuses fall 
far short of an “egalitarian” ideal.253 Focusing on egalitarian-
 
 250. See KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE SOCIAL CON-
STRUCTION OF VICTIMS 99–103 (1989).  
 251. I don’t mean to sugar coat this problem. In my twenty years of teach-
ing law school, for every one woman I have known who has been willing to re-
port a professor or fellow student for inappropriate sexual behavior, there 
have been at least three students who just don’t want to call attention to 
themselves. Shockingly, to me, it is often their mothers who tell them not to 
report anything officially.  
 252. See Libby Sander, Two Worlds, One Problem, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., 
Mar. 24, 2014 (describing parallel problems with sexual assault in the military 
and on college campuses and reporting that “attention is acute. In both worlds, 
survivors—as many identify themselves—are driving the discussion. They are 
optimistic that a combination of grass-roots advocacy, legislative action and 
sustained media exposure will lead to meaningful progress”); see also Pérez-
Peña & Taylor, supra note 65 (describing activity at Columbia University); 
Robin Wilson, Ads Urge Students To Think Twice About Colleges with a “Rape 
Problem,” CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 15, 2014 (describing campaign by a 
group called UltraViolet to target ads at people accepted at colleges who have 
been lax in enforcing sexual assault prohibitions).  
 253. See ROSIN, supra note 56, at 18 (quoting a Yale graduate who 
acknowledges that college is not an “egalitarian sexual wonderland . . . [b]ut 
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ism, or the lack thereof, is probably the best strategy; but it is 
no guarantee of success.  
2. Is It Enough?  
Changing the norm of male sexual entitlement on universi-
ty campuses, even if successful, may seem like an incomplete 
remedy. Only 42% of Americans between the ages of 18–24 go 
to college.254 Still, “norm cascades” can follow from relatively 
small but concentrated efforts to change norms.255 DOE’s efforts 
have generated a great deal of press.256 At least one United 
States Senator has launched her own investigation of sexual 
assault on college campuses.257 Particularly if there is pent-up 
frustration with the status quo—as there may be not just 
among women, but among others who have come to view the 
male behavior as wrong if not criminal—the status quo of what 
is acceptable can change rapidly.258 On college campuses, if 
people get used to seeing men held accountable, not necessarily 
expelled, but punished for their behavior, such that they have 
diminished freedom to pick their classes, or their dorm, or di-
 
compared to when girls are punished for any sexual experience before mar-
riage, it’s much better”).  
 254. See Fast Facts: Back to School Statistics, NAT’L CTR. FOR EDUC. STA-
TISTICS, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=372 (last visited Oct. 17, 
2015). 
 255. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 38 (1997) 
(“Norm cascades occur when societies are presented with rapid shifts toward 
new norms.”).  
 256. From January to July of 2014, the New York Times alone had 37 dif-
ferent stories about sexual assault on college campuses. Sexual Assault Stories 
in the New York Times, N.Y. TIMES, query.nytimes.com/search/sitesearch/ 
(limit search date range to 1/1/2014 to 7/31/2014; then search “sexual assault” 
and “college campus”). With the publication of the discredited Rolling Stone 
story on an alleged rape at the University of Virginia, coverage of sexual as-
sault on college campuses seemed to be everywhere. See generally Richard 
Pérez-Peña, University Officials Blast Coverage, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2014, at 
A15.  
 257. Sexual Violence on Campus: How Too Many Institutions of Higher Ed-
ucation Are Failing To Protect Students, SENATOR CLAIRE MCCASKILL (July 9, 
2014), http://www.mccaskill.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/SurveyReportwithApp 
endix.pdf. 
 258.  
People’s private judgments and desires diverge greatly from public 
appearances. For this reason, current social states can be far more 
fragile than is generally thought—as small shocks to publicly en-
dorsed norms and roles decrease the cost of displaying deviant norms 
and rapidly bring about large-scale changes in publicly displayed 
judgments and desires. 
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minished freedom to go to parties, then people will cease to see 
this behavior as normal or inevitable.259 Once a significant, like-
ly influential, segment of society sees a given behavior as unac-
ceptable, their understanding of what is permissible can cas-
cade downward.  
The campaign against drunk driving may provide an im-
portant lesson in this regard. Most people who have studied the 
issue believe that the significant decrease in the amount of 
drunk driving that started in the 1990s was not the result of 
increases in criminal enforcement rates or increased criminal 
penalties, but came from an extra-legal campaign to alter the 
norms that had invested people with a sense of entitlement to 
drive after drinking.260 What changed was not the number of 
laws against drunk driving or an increased likelihood of being 
stopped, but the way people thought about drinking and driv-
ing. As Dan Kahan concluded, “[i]nformal enforcement of the 
law, in the form of privately imposed stigma, was the gentle 
nudge that shook loose the . . . norms that condoned drunk 
driving.”261 DOE’s campaign represents a comparable campaign 
to change the social norms that condone legally proscribed be-
havior. People and institutions outside the criminal law seek to 
change norms so that, ultimately, the criminal law can be en-
forced.  
Even if a proliferation of discrimination claims does not 
make it any easier to secure criminal convictions, eroding the 
norm of male entitlement to sex will reduce the amount of non-
consensual sex. As Professors Paul Robinson and John Darley 
observe, “[t]he real power to gain compliance with society’s 
rules of prescribed conduct lies not in the threat or reality of of-
ficial criminal sanction, but in . . . [t]he networks of interper-
sonal relationships in which people find themselves, [and] the 
social norms and prohibitions shared among those relation-
ships . . . .”262 Erosion of men’s sense of sexual entitlement may 
not make enough people willing to criminally punish non-
consensual sex, but it should further decrease men’s likelihood 
 
 259. This may be particularly true for college students, for whom the free-
dom to choose one’s roommates and one’s parties is likely considered particu-
larly important.  
 260. See Kahan, supra note 78, at 633–34 (discussing Mothers Against 
Drunk Driving (MADD) and the moral campaign to decrease drunk driving).  
 261. Id. 
 262. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. 
L. REV. 453, 457 (1997).  
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of engaging in increasingly non-normative behavior. The moni-
ker “rape reform” suggested that what reformers cared about 
was changing the definition of rape. They did. But surely they 
were just as concerned with decreasing the amount of non-
consensual sex. It may be the best way to reduce non-
consensual sex is to treat it as something distinct from rape.  
The danger, from a feminist perspective, is that treating 
sexual misconduct as less serious than the common under-
standing of rape may trivialize men’s conduct and lead to far 
too little moral condemnation of men’s sense of entitlement to 
sex. But taking the opposite approach, criminalizing what had 
been normative conduct in the name of protecting women’s 
right to sexual autonomy has not worked well to date either. 
And, for the reasons suggested above, it is not likely to be par-
ticularly effective at further eroding the norm of male entitle-
ment to sex going forward. It may be time, and DOE has sug-
gested that it is time, to try something new.  
Focusing on discrimination instead of rape also helps 
switch the focus away from victim injury and onto what is 
wrong with perpetrator behavior. This may be useful because, 
as Part IV suggested, the subjective, psychological and non-
physical nature of rape’s injury often generates a quagmire of 
commentary that fails to produce consensus on how and why 
women are hurt by rape. Even if we cannot adequately describe 
the injury resulting from that non-consensual sex, the extent to 
which college women must confront predatory male sexual be-
havior is striking.263 If DOE’s efforts can generate consensus 
that the perpetrator behavior is problematic, even if not crimi-
nal, because it forces women to endure insults and hardships 
that men rarely have to endure, then the questions regarding 
how women are hurt recede into the background. It does not 
matter exactly how they are hurt if there is a general under-
standing that they are treated unfairly and it is men who are 
treating them that way.  
CONCLUSION   
This Article has argued that the criminal law has been un-
able to prosecute as rape a tremendous amount of non-
consensual sex because it is too difficult to prove beyond a rea-
sonable doubt, because the law’s treatment of rape sends pro-
 
 263 . See MICHAEL ET AL., supra note 30, at 223. 
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foundly inconsistent messages about who rapists are and how 
bad rape is, and because women resist seeing themselves as 
rape victims. DOE’s attempt to re-cast sexual assault as a dis-
criminatory harm may allow universities to unearth and pun-
ish far more non-consensual sex than the criminal law has been 
able to. This may then lead to more substantial erosion of the 
social norm that validates male entitlement to sex because peo-
ple will see men punished for assuming that their entitlement 
to sex overrides a woman’s quiet desire not to go forward. If 
that norm is more successfully eroded, criminal prosecution 
may then become easier as male entitlement to sex begins to 
seem less legitimate.  
There is some convergence, then, between what I’ve sug-
gested here and Professor Rubenfeld’s insistence that the force 
requirement be part of the definition of rape. At least in the 
short term, perhaps the criminal law of rape should focus only 
or mainly on those instances in which force or threat of force is 
apparent. The criminal law should do this not because the inju-
ry that women suffer in rape is so much worse or qualitatively 
different when force is involved, but because proving force is all 
the criminal law can do, and it is all many women seem willing 
to let the criminal law try to do. Professor Rubenfeld argues 
that the feminist attempt to make force irrelevant was theoret-
ically unsound and normatively problematic. This Article coun-
ters that it is the theory and normative commitments that are 
irrelevant. Assuming basic allegiance to criminal due process, 
including criminal standards of proof and rights to impeach-
ment and confrontation, the criminal law simply cannot do 
what feminists asked it to do. The law of sex discrimination, 
particularly applied in an educational setting, quite possibly 
could.  
 
 
